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Regulation Not Prohibition: The 
Comparative Case Against the 
Insurable Interest Doctrine 
Sharo Michael Atmeh 
Abstract: American law requires an insurable interest—a pecuniary or affective 
stake in the subject of an insurance policy—as a predicate to properly obtaining 
insurance.  In theory, the rule prevents both wagering on individual lives and 
moral hazard.  In practice, the doctrine is avoided by complex insurance trans-
action structuring to effectuate both origination and transfers of insurance by 
individuals without an insurable interest.  This paper argues that it is time to 
abandon the insurable interest doctrine.  As both the English and Australian ex-
periences indicate, elimination of the insurable interest doctrine will have little 
detrimental pecuniary effect on the insurance industry, while freeing consumers 
considerably.  Indeed, New York comes to the brink of eliminating the doctrine 
in its recent decision in Kramer v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co. by sanctioning an 
immediate life insurance assignment procedure that in effect eliminates the need 
for an insurable interest in the assignee.  However, Delaware, in PHL Variable 
Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust and Lincoln National Life In-
surance Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Insurance Trust, breathes new life into an 
old doctrine.  Overall, though, adhering to an arcane doctrine that prevents the 
value of an insurance policy from being realized without extreme legal burden 
both hampers the market and harms consumers, as the benefits of such transac-
tions are both lessened by transaction costs and accrue to only a select few indi-
viduals. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For hundreds of years, people have been trying to invest in the lives of 
other persons through insurance policies; meanwhile, the insurable interest 
doctrine has attempted to stop them and failed.  In the United States, widely 
divergent insurable interest laws in the several states nominally prohibit 
taking out a life insurance policy on an individual without having a stake in 
the person’s well-being.1  The logic behind this rule is obvious: to prevent 
the creation of a futures market on a pool of individuals’ lives.  However, 
this paper argues that the rule does more harm than good.  There are plausi-
ble policy reasons for such a rule, but those policies can be achieved with 
other more finely tuned, specific, and coherent rules.  Laws preventing in-
dividuals from collecting improperly on life insurance or by fraudulently 
drawn wills already alleviate much of the problem of any potential futures 
market in individual well-being.  The structure of the insurable interest rule 
is not only completely duplicative of laws preventing fraud in the field, but 
it also creates massive amounts of evasion by market actors and engenders 
substantial transaction costs. 
While the insurable interest doctrine sounds like an age-old component 
of the common law, it is not.  Prior to 1745, a pecuniary or emotional inter-
est in the subject of an insurance policy was not a requirement for the re-
ceipt of a payout from that policy.  Thus, insurance contracts were held val-
id, notwithstanding that the absence of an insurable interest gave the 
 
1 Leslie Scism, Regulators Rein In Murky Life Policies, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704324304575306440620747882.html?KE
YWORDS=insurable+interest#printMode. 
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transaction the characteristics of a wager.2  The insurable interest doctrine 
developed in response to the common law’s validation of such contracts in 
an effort to both prevent wagers on the lives of individuals and to quell at-
tempts to destroy the subject of an insurance policy.  Lacking more finely 
tuned regulatory tools, the insurable interest doctrine was developed by an 
English parliament trying to rein in such “wagers” in the mid-eighteenth 
century. 
The doctrine is now effectively avoided by persons who structure their 
deals to escape its reach.  Even before these evasion techniques were devel-
oped, as discussed below, the doctrine was expanded via statute to the point 
where the purported barrier became meaningless to sophisticated parties.  
Well-informed parties can simply thwart the doctrine through the creation 
of a “cloak” that tricks insurance firms into thinking an insurable interest 
does exist in an insurance policy.  A common cloak works by making it 
nominally appear that the person taking out the insurance policy has an in-
terest in the subject of the insurance, because the cloak makes it look like it 
is the insured herself taking out the policy.  Further, a statutory loosening of 
the insurable interest doctrine expanded the definition of who may take out 
an insurance policy far enough that even the mildest pecuniary connection 
can qualify for an insurable interest alongside individuals with an affective 
or consanguine interest.  Even before these modern evasions, however, at 
least one scholar in history claimed that the insurable interest doctrine was 
merely technical and should be eliminated because criminal, trust, and es-
tate law otherwise protect an insured from being murdered by contemporar-
ies holding an insurance policy on the insured’s life.3 
Reform in this area is particularly difficult, largely because companies 
promoting life insurance transferability resist regulation, as do the insurance 
firms that underwrite the policies.  For example, because insurers benefit 
from an option to later invalidate insurance policies, they have an interest in 
maintaining the insurable interest doctrine, as it allows them to retain a last-
ditch defense against the assignment of a policy.  Furthermore, the firms 
that operate in the realm of transferring insurance policies by creating 
cloaks seek to retain the profits gained from fees charged to structure these 
transactions.  Indeed, because of the complex structuring involved, much of 
the financial benefit from the industry in secondary life insurance does not 
accrue to either the insured or the person to whom the policy is transferred.  
Often times, the insured is forced to pay out insurance premiums on a poli-
 
2 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 41:1 (3d ed. 2011). 
3 Cf. Edwin W. Patterson, Insurable Interest in Life, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 381, 390 (1918) 
(citing FREDERICK H. COOKE, THE LAW OF LIFE INSURANCE §§ 58, 59 (1st ed. 1891) for the 
propositions that criminal law protects against murder; while “unjust enrichment” law pro-
tects beneficiaries from collecting on insurance policies which are triggered by their murder-
ing the subject of the insurance—today these laws would be known as “slayer” laws). 
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cy that the insured has been told will be resold by an arranger—only to later 
find out that the policy is not salable.  At other times, insurance companies 
will turn a blind eye to potential problems in insurable interest at the for-
mation of a policy—only to later rely on the insurable interest doctrine as 
an affirmative defense when the policy is redeemable.  Yet other times, in-
dividuals seeking to invest in the insurance market by purchasing other in-
surance policies are told that a policy will reap double-digit returns—only 
to realize that the arranger of a policy, like Life Partners Holdings Inc., has 
substantially understated the risk involved in such an investment.4  All of 
these market failures come about as a result of the insurable interest doc-
trine’s existence.5 
This paper will argue that the insurable interest doctrine no longer 
achieves the regulatory goals that it intends to achieve.  I advocate for an 
elimination of the doctrine.  As an affirmative defense, allowing insurance 
companies to invalidate an insurance policy many years after its inception it 
is too blunt a regulatory instrument.  Developments in the modern market 
and other financial regulations, including the development of a modern reg-
ulatory environment for securities, obviate the need for an insurable interest 
doctrine.  The idea that individuals should be free to alienate their own in-
surance policies is not new, and neither is the idea that the doctrine should 
be eliminated entirely.  This paper takes the view that the American legal 
system should follow the lead of Australia to eliminate the insurable interest 
doctrine entirely for both property and life insurance, while creating a com-
prehensive national regulatory scheme that will streamline a market bloated 
with unnecessary actors and a thicket of burdensome and conflicting regula-
tion. 
Arguing for the elimination of the insurable interest doctrine in Ameri-
ca through a comparative lens is unique to this paper.  Part II will explore 
the parallels between development of the insurable interest doctrine in Eng-
land and the United States.  It will then explain the plethora of American 
laws and model codes that attempt to elucidate the doctrine, but which con-
tinue to fall short and lead to highly inefficient case-by-case determinations.  
Part III will explain how a highly complex market has developed with the 
sole purpose of getting around the insurable interest doctrine in the life set-
tlement market.  The section will then explain the policy reasons for the 
elimination of the doctrine, focusing on the elimination of transaction costs.  
Part III will highlight how the insurable interest doctrine harms the actors it 
was meant to protect: individual persons who are the subject of insurance 
policies and persons who seek to invest in such policies.  Finally, Part IV 
will show that the natural experiment in Australia proves that the insurable 
 
      4 See Scism, supra note 1.   
5 See infra Part III.E.2. 
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interest doctrine can be eliminated without any significant effect on the size 
or financial sustainability of the insurance industry, but with greater free-
dom for both consumers and investors to enter a regulated market.  Indeed, 
the Australia example will show that the insurance market continues to 
grow, even in the absence of the insurable interest doctrine. 
II.  PRECEDENT & COMPARATIVE BACKGROUND ON THE 
INSURABLE INTEREST DOCTRINE 
The insurable interest doctrine is, or was, a creature of statute in the 
United States,6 England,7 and Australia.8  Under very similar historical con-
ditions in their respective insurance markets, these three nations developed 
an insurable interest doctrine that substantially emulated an original English 
doctrine.  However, two of those three nations have either completely elim-
inated (in the case of Australia) or substantially abrogated (in the case of 
England) the insurable interest doctrine.  In the field of insurable interest, 
America is the laggard in insurance law.  This part of the paper will estab-
lish the historical similarity of the doctrine between England and the United 
States to provide the necessary background for understanding why the 
United States should follow the lead of England and Australia in eliminat-
ing the insurable interest doctrine. 
A.  What is the Insurable Interest Doctrine? 
The insurable interest doctrine requires that someone taking out insur-
ance either benefit from the preservation of the subject matter of the insur-
ance or suffer a disadvantage from loss of the insured subject.9  The history 
behind this definition of the insurable interest in the three nations’ doctrines 
can be traced back to two strands of English doctrine established by statute 
in 1745 for property and in 1774 for life insurance.  The first strand, dealing 
with actual pecuniary losses for property, is the “indemnity” insurance 
strand.10  The second strand, dealing with life insurance and loss of life, is 
dubbed the “non-indemnity” insurance strand.  Essentially, the insurable in-
 
6 See infra Part II.C. 
7 See Life Assurance Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, § I (Eng.). 
8 See Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth) s 200 (Austl.). 
9 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 2, § 41:17.  
As a general rule, it can be stated that a person has an insurable interest in the life 
of another if he or she can reasonably expect to receive pecuniary gain from the 
continued life of the other person and conversely, if he or she would suffer finan-
cial loss from the latter’s death . . . . 
Id.  See also LAW COMM’N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, INSURABLE INTEREST: ISSUES PAPER 4, 
4 (2008) (U.K.), available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/download_file/view/203/107/. 
10 Patterson, supra note 3, at 386 (defining “insurable interest” as a person’s “maximum 
possible pecuniary loss from the happening of the event.”). 
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terest doctrine operates as a defense used by the insurer to estop insured in-
dividuals who lack an interest in the person or object insured from collect-
ing on insurance policies after an insured event happens. 
At common law—before the English legislature intervened with two 
statutes—a gambling contract was not illegal.11  Thus, contracts “which 
were cloaked in the guise of policies of insurance were valid . . . .”12  At the 
time, parties simply declared whether they had an interest by using terms 
like “interest or no interest” or “without proof of interest,” and, thus, delin-
eated whether they were making an indemnity contract or a wager.13  With-
out the “interest” clause, courts would construe the contract as one of in-
demnity and give no remuneration to the insured unless she could prove an 
actual loss.14  However, after the enactments of the Marine Insurance Act of 
174515 and the Life Assurance Act of 1774,16 having an “interest”—whether 
pecuniary or consanguine—became a non-elective, mandatory term for the 
enforcement of any insurance contract. 
B.  History of the Insurable Interest Doctrine 
1.  England 
In a sharp break with the common law, the Marine Insurance Act of 
1745 invalidated insurance policies taken out on marine cargo if the person 
taking out the insurance had no pecuniary interest in the goods.17  The Eng-
lish Parliament came to require an insurable interest because it was found 
“by Experience, that the making Assurances, . . . without further Proof of 
Interest than the Policy, hath been productive of many pernicious Practices, 
whereby great Numbers of Ships with their Cargoes, have . . . been fraudu-
lently lost and destroyed.”18  Indeed, going further, it was common in Eng-
land at the time to “wager on another’s life, in the form of insurance, by 
persons in no way connected nor in any manner interested in the insured’s 
life.”19  In transactions that have parallels to today’s insurance industry:20 
Popular accounts of the period describe the practice of purchasing 
 




15 Marine Insurance Act, 1745, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37 (Eng.). 
16 Life Assurance Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48 (Eng.). 
17 Marine Insurance Act, 1745, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37, § I (Eng.). 
18 Id. 
19 Gary Salzman, Murder, Wagering, and Insurable Interest in Life Insurance, 30 THE J. 
OF INS. 555, 562 (1963). 
20 See infra Part III.A. 
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insurance on the lives of those being tried for capital crimes.  These 
policies constituted naked wagers on whether the accused would ul-
timately be convicted and executed for the alleged offense.  A related 
practice was the purchase of insurance on the lives of famous, elder-
ly persons; the premium would be a function of what was known 
about the person’s health, including any recent illnesses.21 
Given these practices, the English Parliament developed a major con-
cern over wagering not only on property but also on individual lives.  Thus, 
less than 30 years after the establishment of the insurable interest doctrine 
for property, the doctrine was extended to life insurance contracts with the 
Life Assurance Act of 1774.22  The locus of the 1774 enactment was not 
necessarily a concern about hastening the death of these individuals, but ra-
ther about gambling on a morally prohibited subject.  In a similar preamble 
to the 1745 enactment, Parliament states, “[i]t hath been found by experi-
ence that the making insurances on the lives or other events wherein the as-
sured shall have no interest hath introduced a mischievous king of gam-
ing . . . .”23  Interestingly, Parliament seemed to have placed another 
limitation on the writing of insurance policies at the time by stating that “no 
greater sum shall be recovered or received from the insurer . . . than the 
amount of value of the interest of the insured in such life or lives, or other 
event or events.”24  Thus, it would seem that the same principles underlying 
property insurance law—primarily in indemnity contracts—were applied to 
individual lives by simply applying the property policy to life insurance.  
Unfortunately, the English Parliament did not provide any guidance on 
what exactly constituted an insurable interest, and it was left to the courts to 
decide on a case-by-case basis through highly fact-dependent determina-
tions. 
As attitudes against gambling hardened, English law indirectly created 
an insurable interest obligation for various property indemnity contracts 
with the Gaming Act of 1845.25  Section 18 of the 1845 Gaming Act created 
the requirement that a policyholder must be able to demonstrate an insura-
ble interest in the subject matter of the insurance; otherwise, the contract is 
invalid as a “wager.”26  Marine insurable interest laws were also strength-
ened with the passing27 of the Marine Insurance Acts of 190628 and 1909.29  
 
21 ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 292 (3d ed. 2002); see also 
Peter Nash Swisher, The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance: A Critical Reas-
sessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 481 (2005). 
22 Life Assurance Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 48 (Eng.). 
23 Id. pmbl. 
24 Id. § III. 
25 Gaming Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109 (Eng.). 
26 Id. § 18; see also LAW COMM’N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
27 LAW COMM’N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, supra note 9, at 8. 
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The 1906 Act defined someone as having an interest in a marine adventure 
when:  
[H]e stands in any legal or equitable relation . . . to any insurable 
property at risk therein, in consequence of which he may benefit by 
the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be prejudiced 
by its loss, or . . . damage . . . or may incur liability in respect there-
of.30   
While this definition provides some clarity about what an insurable interest 
is, it does not provide for when facts and circumstances affecting such an 
interest occur.  The 1906 Act extended the penalties for taking out a marine 
insurance policy without an insurable interest and made such action a crim-
inal offense, punishable by a fine or prison for up to six months.31  Evident-
ly, though, no prosecutions ever occurred under this act.32  Even at this 
point, the English parliament again did not provide guidance on the insura-
ble interest concept, and most of the heavy lifting with respect to defining 
and regulating an insurable interest was left to the courts. 
Two major cases interpreted insurable interest legislation prior to 
2005.  First, in 1806, Lucena v. Craufurd33 laid out the definition of insura-
ble interest for England and all of its territories.  Establishing what later be-
came known as the beginnings of an economic “relationship” test, the 
House of Lords stated, “[t]o be interested in the preservation of a thing, is to 
be circumstanced with respect to it as to have benefit from its existence, 
prejudice from its destruction.”34  Thus, if one’s position in life were either 
benefitted or damaged by an interest in a life or object, then an interest can 
be claimed in that subject.  This logic seems mildly circular, as the exist-
ence of one legal right depends on the existence of other legal or equitable 
rights.   
Over 100 years later, in 1925, Macaura v. Northern Assurance,35 
helped sharpen the definition of an insurable interest only somewhat.  In 
Macaura, Lord Buckmaster indicated that no shareholder had any right to 
any company property because she (or, more likely at the time, he) had no 
legal or equitable interest.36  According to Macaura, a shareholder’s rela-
tionship was to the company, not to the company’s goods, and thus any 
 
28 Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41 (Eng.). 
29 Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 12 (Eng.). 
30 Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 5 (Eng.). 
31 Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act, 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c.12, § 1 (Eng.). 
32 See SUTTON, supra note 11, at 8 n.17. 
33 (1806) 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
34 Id. at 643. 
35 [1925] A.C. 619 (H.L.) (appeal taken from N. Ir.) (Eng.). 
36 Id. at 626. 
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damage to the goods was not to the shareholder, but merely to a company’s 
assets.37  To at least one Lord adjudging the Macaura case, this difference 
in interests mirrored the separation of ownership and control in a corpora-
tion.38  The Macaura court also indicated that a creditor does not have an 
insurable interest in a debtor’s property, but an interest did exist in the life 
of that debtor.39   
More recently, in 1987, the Supreme Court of Canada called into ques-
tion the legal interest test developed in Lucena through its decision in Kos-
mopoulos v. Constitution Insurance Co.40  In Kosmopoulos, the court found 
no basis in public policy for a restrictive formalistic definition.41  Thus, 
overall, some economic relationship or concern in the subject of the insur-
ance would be sufficient for an insurable interest.42  This economic interest 
test was said to fall in line with the majority of U.S. jurisdictions on the top-
ic.43  Uncertainty in both the definition and status of an insurable interest 
remained paramount in England until 2005. 
The area of insurable interest law remained unchanged in England, at 
least legislatively, until the Gambling Act of 2005.44  The Gambling Act in-
tended to regulate new gambling ventures on the Internet and through tech-
nologies that helped such transactions occur outside British Law.  “[The 
English] [g]overnment wanted to provide rigorous and effective protection 
for the public by creating a regulatory regime for gambling.”45  The Gam-
bling Act repealed Section 18 of the 1845 Gaming Act, and replaced it with 
the following language: “The fact that a contract relates to gambling does 
not prevent its enforcement.”46  Thus, by making gambling legal in an effort 
to regulate it in the United Kingdom, the insurable interest doctrine was 
dealt a death knell—at least when it came to insurance relating to property.  
Meanwhile, for life insurance, the 1774 Life Assurance Act still controls.  
Thus, in England, the insurable interest doctrine was eliminated by acci-
dent. 
 
37 Id. at 630. 
38 Id. at 633. 
39 Id. at 626. 
40 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2 (Can.). 
41 Id. at 3. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See Gambling Act, 2005, c. 19, §§ 334–35 (Eng.). 
45 LAW COMM’N & SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, supra note 9, at 8 (citing British Gov’t, Gov-
ernment Response to the First Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Gambling Bill 2 
(2004)). 
46 Gambling Act, 2005, c. 19, § 335 (Eng.). 
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2.  The United States 
While the insurable interest doctrine developed formally in England 
through statute, it appears to have developed with a public policy bent in 
the United States.47  Mirroring the twin roots of the insurable interest doc-
trine in England, the United States seems to have developed insurable inter-
est ideas separately for both property insurance (“indemnity contracts”) and 
life insurance (“non-indemnity contracts”).  The earliest reference to these 
policies occurred in the property context in 1803 in Pritchet v. Insurance 
Co. of North America.48  Treating insurable interest in property as a public 
policy dictate, the Pritchet court stated: 
We have adopted the policy and principles which gave rise to . . . 
[The Marine Insurance Act of 1746] both in courts of justice and by 
commercial usage; but we are not prepared to say, that every particu-
lar provision or resolution under it, has been engrafted into our sys-
tem of law.  An insurance amongst us, is a contract of indemnity.  Its 
object is, not to make a positive gain, but to avert a possible loss.  A 
man can never be said to be indemnified against a loss which can 
never happen to him.49 
This very early passage is interesting in many respects.  First, it direct-
ly cites to an earlier act of British Parliament, and says that it is adopting 
those policies as a matter of public policy (through the common law) in at 
least one of the states.  Second, the court goes on to carve out precisely 
which of the policies from the English statute that it is adopting into Ameri-
can law.  Judge Yeates chooses to peg the idea of an insurable interest to an 
actual loss being wrought to a person claiming proceeds under an insurance 
contract.  Thus, the actual loss motive in this particular American judge’s 
mind seems to differ slightly from the anti-gambling motives envisaged by 
the British Parliament’s version of an insurable interest.  These motives are 
clear for the property or “indemnity” contract version of insurance policies. 
More than ten years after the insurable interest doctrine was elucidated 
for indemnity contracts, the insurable interest policy was applied to life in-
surance.50  In Lord v. Dall, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated 
that the law of insurable interest applied to a life insurance policy taken out 
by a sister to insure the life of her brother while he sailed on a cargo ship 
 
47 The history of the insurable interest doctrine is dealt with in greater depth and thor-
oughness elsewhere; this paper does not seek to replicate that research.  Rather, the history 
provided here is selected to show the trajectory of the development of insurable interest laws 
and markets in the United States. 
48 3 Yeates 458, 464 (Pa. 1803). 
49 Id. (emphasis in original). 
50 See Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. (11 Tyng.) 115 (1815). 
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from December 1809 to July 1810.51  The court in Dall did not base its rul-
ing—that insurable interest doctrine applied to life insurance—on the Eng-
lish statute.  Rather, the court said that a life insurance policy without an in-
surable interest would be “contrary to the general policy of our laws. . . .”52  
As to determining what an insurable interest truly is, the court found satis-
factory nothing more than the “common understanding no one would hesi-
tate to say, that in the life of such a brother the sister had an interest. . . .”53  
In an unusual admonition, the court in Dall stated that it cannot easily be 
discerned why the underwriters of such an insurance policy should question 
its validity “after a loss has taken place, when it does not appear that any 
doubts existed when the contract was made; although the same subject was 
then in their contemplation.”54 
Thus, as early on as the first cases that formulated the insurable inter-
est doctrine in the U.S., some interesting quirks in the doctrine are apparent.  
First, American judges seem to base their decisions not on any statute, but 
on some sense that insurable interest is integral to the public policy struc-
ture of the states.  It is important to note the deep similarities between Eng-
land’s basis in statute and the United States’ basis in public policy, as they 
establish the insurable interest doctrine with the same principles, but with 
two different methods of reasoning.  Second, the determination of what 
qualifies for an affective stake triggering an insurable interest is unclear, 
and this lack of clarity existed even at the time of the doctrine’s inception.  
Third, insurance companies have consistently asserted the insurable interest 
defense well after the formation of an insurance policy, even though they 
are entitled to examine issues concerning the insurable interest at the outset 
of the policy—while the consumer is not allowed to create an insurable in-
terest after-the-fact to save the policy. 
Over the ensuing decades, the insurable interest doctrine developed on 
highly fact-based grounds, and the issue wound itself into the Supreme 
Court.  The seminal quote upon which most scholars attribute modern in-
surable interest doctrines in the several states is found in Warnock v. Da-
vis.55  In Warnock, the Supreme Court based the validity of an insurance 
policy on the following: “[I]n all [life insurance] cases there must be a rea-
sonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, ei-
ther pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage 
from the continuance of the life of the assured.”56  The Court went on to re-
suscitate the wagering concerns from the British system as the reason un-
 
51 Id. at 118. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 119. 
55 104 U.S. 775 (1881). 
56 Id. at 779. 
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derpinning insurable interest law in America by stating that without an in-
surable interest, “[a] contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking the 
policy is directly interested in the early death of the assured.”57  Finally, the 
court extended insurable interest doctrine one step further by stating that, 
“[t]he assignment of a policy to a party not having an insurable interest is as 
objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his name . . .  [That person] 
stands in the position of one holding a[n invalid] wager policy.”58  Implicit-
ly, then, the court in Warnock placed the cost of an insurable interest wager 
on the consumer of the insurance policy—the insurance companies have the 
right, but not the obligation, to assert the insurable interest defense and in-
validate a policy. 
Around the time of the Warnock decision, there appears to have been 
some indecision in the American courts about whether a life insurance con-
tract was one of indemnity or non-indemnity.59  The Supreme Court seems 
to settle this question in Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bailey by 
stating: 
Life insurances have sometimes been construed in the same way [as 
indemnity insurance policies], but the better opinion is that the de-
cided cases which proceed upon the ground that the insured must 
necessarily have some pecuniary interest in the life of the cestui qui 
vie60 . . . [indicate] that the contract of life insurance is not necessari-
ly one merely of indemnity for a pecuniary loss . . . .61 
For the historical purposes of this paper, it is important to note that while 
the insurable interest doctrine originated in a muddy fashion, there exists a 
clear difference between indemnity and non-indemnity contract types.62 
Bailey, combined with the decision in Grigsby v. Russell,63 brings both 
the American and the English systems in line with each other on the mo-
tives for insurable interest.64  In Grigsby, the Supreme Court sanctioned the 




59 See Patterson, supra note 3, at 381. 
60 This term refers to the life that is the subject of the life insurance policy. 
61 80 U.S. 616, 619 (1871). 
62 See RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 2, § 103:4 (stating, for example, that: “The major 
substantive distinction between a liability policy and an indemnity contract is that payment 
of a claim by the insured is a condition precedent to the insured’s right to recover under the 
indemnity contract, but not under the liability contract.  This distinction also means that lia-
bility insurance covers injuries sustained by third parties, while indemnity contracts cover 
first party losses.”). 
63 222 U.S. 149 (1911). 
64 Id. at 155. 
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in the insured.65  In that case, Justice Holmes stated, “the ground of the ob-
jection to life insurance without interest in the earlier English cases was not 
the temptation to murder, but the fact that such wagers came to be regarded 
as a mischievous kind of gaming.”66  Thus, at the turn of the century, the 
Supreme Court painted the full picture of what it believed to be insurable 
interest policy: (1) an insurable interest—either pecuniary or blood—must 
exist prior to the execution of a life insurance policy; (2) if not, then the in-
surance policy is void and does not need to pay out; and (3) this must be the 
case, otherwise people will engage in “wagering” on each other’s lives that 
can be tied to the risk of murdering (in the case of humans) or destroying 
(in the case of property) the subject of the insurance.  American law as it 
currently stands is elucidated in the next section. 
C.  Current U.S. Law Governing the Insurable Interest 
While the insurable interest doctrine began as judge-made law, with no 
legislative basis in the United States, it was later codified by many of the 
states.67  Such codification, across fifty jurisdictions, leaves the legal land-
scape uncertain for both insurance companies and consumers with respect 
to the insurable interest doctrine, as considerable variation among the fifty 
states’ laws exists.  Essentially, states seek to regulate what is called the 
“secondary life insurance” market through the lens of the insurable interest 
doctrine.  In its simplest form, the secondary market for life insurance poli-
cies originates because the surrender price of a life insurance policy is much 
less than the price the same policy would fetch if it were sold to investors 
on the open market.68  An individual can sell his or her life insurance policy 
for a value below the face value of the policy, but above its cash-surrender 
 
65 Id. at 156. 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 502.102(31A) (2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 16102(32) 
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1101(17) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-49(w) (2010); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 78A-2(13) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(21) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1707.01 (LexisNexis 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-13(1)(v) (LexisNexis 2009); 
WIS. STAT. § 551.102(32) (2009). 
68 See Jared Heady, Regulating the Secondary Market for Life Insurance: Promoting 
Consistency to Maximize Utility, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851 (2010).  
Since life insurance companies had universally decided to refuse buying back is-
sued policies, policyholders who could not afford to continue paying premiums 
were left with the option to either default, and subsequently let their policy lapse, 
or seek liquidation at an auction.  Seeing injustice in these limited options, Elizur 
Wright, known to many as ‘the father of life insurance,’ endeavored to attach a 
cash-surrender value to life insurance policies, an amount reflective of the market 
value for the policy that the issuing life insurance company would be required to 
pay if policyholders default or seek to liquidate their policy.   
Id. 
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value, to an investor or a group of investors on the open market.  Thus, in-
stead of settling for the cash-surrender value, individuals seek to maximize 
the value of their life insurance policies by going to the open market.69 
From the paltry sum arising out of the cash-surrender practice, the sec-
ondary life insurance industry exists because investors make an arbitrage 
bet between a cash-surrender value and a policy’s face value.  Indeed, the 
bet is a gruesome one that the individual will die either as actuarially 
scheduled or before, and that the payment from the face value of the policy 
will exceed premiums paid in by a certain percentage.70  The insured gains 
because she gets much-needed immediate cash flow from an insurance poli-
cy.  Meanwhile, investors enter the market as an investment for an oppor-
tunity to reap double-digit returns on their capital in an alternative product.  
The policy ramifications of this market and the effect of insurable interest 
regulation on it will be discussed below.71  However, this section will seek 
to lay out the current legal landscape in the United States for the insurable 
interest doctrine as is expressed in laws governing the secondary market for 
life insurance settlements in three fields: (1) viatical settlements;72 (2) life 
settlements;73 and (3) stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI) policies.74 
To date, states fall into a few distinct categories of insurable interest 
legislation.  Very few locales attempt to prohibit the “secondary market” in 
insurance by creating strict insurable interest regimes that invalidate insur-
ance policies if the beneficiary at the time that the death benefit pays out 
does not have an insurable interest.  The more common tact in states like 
Virginia and North Carolina is to structure insurable interest laws around 
the Viatical Settlements Model Act (the NAIC Model Act)75 developed by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (the NAIC) and the 
 
69 Richard J. Fidel & Elizabeth M. Fohl, 2010 in Review: Ten Key Insurance Regulatory 
Topics That Shaped the Year, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5465 (2011) (LEXIS); see also Scism, 
supra note 1. 
70 Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, SEC Probes Company over Life-Span Data, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 20, 2011, at C1. 
71 See infra Part III. 
72 A viatical settlement is a policy that is sold on the open market where the insured has 
less than 24 months to live.  See Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
73 A life settlement is a policy that is sold on the open market where the insured has more 
than 24 months to live. See LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § (2)(L) (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Leg-
islators 2007), available at http://www.ncoil.org/Private/2007/annual/AdoptedLifeSettle 
mentsModel.pdf. 
74 Stranger-originated life insurance policies are policies that are taken out by an insured, 
but are in fact paid for by an investor or other individual and sold immediately after the con-
testability period in a state expires.  See id. § (2)(Y). 
75 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009), available at 
http://www.naic.org/committees_index_model_description_r_z.htm#viatical_act. 
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Life Settlements Model Act (the NCOIL Model Act) 76 adopted by the Na-
tional Conference of Insurance Legislators (the NCOIL).  These states alter 
the insurable interest doctrine by creating extended contestability periods77 
for policies, or preserving insurable interest as a contestable point notwith-
standing the running of a contestability period, or utilizing other alterations 
to the doctrine.78  The most liberal state regime allows for the immediate 
transfer of insurance policies to a beneficiary without an insurable interest.79 
1.  Federal Regimes on Insurable Interest 
Before the particulars of state regulation are elucidated, it is of some 
note that there is already federal legislation on insurable interest in the In-
ternal Revenue Code (the Tax Code).80  The Tax Code explicitly deals with 
income from viatical settlements, and what qualifies as an “amount paid,” 
but does not seem to deal with standard life settlements.81  In some sense, 
the Tax Code does away with the insurable interest requirement itself when 
it states: 
If any portion of the death benefit under a life insurance contract on 
the life of an insured . . . is sold or assigned to a viatical settlement 
provider, the amount paid for the sale or assignment of such portion 
shall be treated as an amount paid under the life insurance contract 
by reason of the death of such insured.82 
Thus, in a few words, the Tax Code—for purposes of deciding payment—
places the assignee of a life insurance policy in the shoes of the insured.  
For any amounts received under an insurance policy, the assignee is taxed 
as though they were the insured—whether or not they exhibit an insurable 
interest—for federal purposes.  Furthermore, the law sets out explicit defi-
nitions for what persons qualify as “terminally ill”83 or “chronically ill,”84 
 
76 LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007). 
77 Contestability periods are discussed in more detail infra Part II.C.3. 
78 See, e.g., PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 1059, 1066  
(Del. Sept. 20, 2011). 
79 See Kramer v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 940 N.E.2d 535, 542 (N.Y. 2010). 
80 I.R.C. § 1 (2010). 
81 See id. § 101(g) (This section is explicitly titled “Treatment of certain accelerated 
death benefits.”). 
82 See id. § 101(g)(2)(A). 
83 See id. § 101(g)(4)(A) (“The term ‘terminally ill individual’ means an individual who 
has been certified by a physician as having an illness or physical condition which can rea-
sonably expected to result in death in 24 months or less after the date of the certification.”). 
84 See id. (“The term ‘chronically ill individual’ has the meaning given such term by sec-
tion 7702B(c)(2); except that such term shall not include a terminally ill individual.”  A 
“chronically ill individual” is defined in I.R.C. § 7702B(c)(2) as a person who is “unable to 
perform (without substantial assistance from another individual) at least 2 activities of daily 
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and carves out special circumstances for the individual brokering the sale of 
a viatical settlement and for a person receiving proceeds from such a set-
tlement.85 
2.  The Model Codes and the States 
Despite the efforts of insurance law reformers to create a model code, 
a vast array of disparate state legislation exists in the insurable interest area.  
Due to the need to protect sick individuals and to create a transparent and 
fair viatical settlements market, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners developed the NAIC Model Act86 and the Viatical Settle-
ments Regulations87 to guide states in their regulation of the viatical settle-
ments industry.  On the life settlements front, the National Conference of 
Insurance Legislators adopted the NCOIL Model Act.  The model acts have 
grown over time to contain licensing requirements, contract statement re-
quirements, reporting requirements and privacy, examinations and investi-
gations, disclosure, general rules, prohibited practices, advertising require-
ments, fraud prevention and control, penalties for failure to comply, and 
unfair trade practices.88  Various portions of these model acts have been 
adopted by the adherent states.  One important difference between the mod-
el acts is the level to which they prohibit stranger-originated life insurance 
transactions—speaking most directly to the most vexing area of insurable 
interest jurisprudence.  The NAIC Model Act imposes a five-year waiting 
period between the time of issuance of a life insurance policy and the time 
of entering into a life settlement contract.89  That is, the NAIC Model Act 
would increase what is called a state’s “contestability period” beyond the 
currently standard two-year period.90  These contestability periods act as the 
primary enforcement time when an insurable interest can be controverted by 
an insurance company.  Thus, if a policy is taken out, and an insurable in-
terest is found not to exist or some other defect is found in a policy during 
the contestability period, the policy can be retracted.  After a contestability 
period runs, however, retracting the policy becomes much more difficult, 
and transferability by the consumer becomes much easier.  For example, af-
ter the contestability period runs, any transaction—even if that transaction 
is to or from a stranger—is not able to be controverted by an insurance firm.  
The NCOIL Model Act, on the other hand, provides a definition of STOLI, 
 
living for a period of at least 90 days due to a loss of functional capacity . . . .”). 
85 See id. § 101(g)(2)–(3). 
86 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009), available at 
http://www.naic.org/committees_index_model_description_r_z.htm#viatical _regulation. 
87 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION ACT (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009),  
88 See, e.g., LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007). 
89 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(A) ) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009). 
90 Heady, supra note 68, at 865 n.115. 
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which indicates that it is prohibited as a “fraudulent life settlement,” and 
subjects a provider, broker, or other person involved in a STOLI transaction 
to criminal penalties or sanctions.91  However, the NCOIL Model Act im-
poses only a two-year waiting period—subject to certain exceptions for 
terminally ill or chronically ill policy owners—prior to entering into a life 
settlement contract.92  That is, the NCOIL Model Act leaves room for indi-
viduals to quickly transfer their life policies and does not extend the waiting 
period beyond a customary two-year period. 
Of particular import, the Tax Code adopts Sections 8 and 9 of the 
NAIC Model Act,93 which outline disclosure requirements to both the vitia-
tor and insurance company by the successor in interest to a policy, respec-
tively.94  Thus, in order to get the proper tax-free treatment for a death bene-
fit paid out from an assigned viatical policy, one is pointed to the model law 
requirement—a rarity in the law—but also a clear indication of a public pol-
icy favoring disclosure in financial transactions, even ones dealing in per-
sonal life insurance.  On the life settlements front, the Internal Revenue 
Service (the IRS) released Revenue Ruling 2009-13, to attempt to clarify 
the issue of what is taxable at the regular income rate and what is taxable as 
capital gains.95  However, the guidance is unclear and the Life Insurance 
Settlement Association has asked for a clarification of the issues from the 
IRS.96 
Jared Heady conducted a very helpful survey of insurable interest 
regulations in early 2010;97 however, given the relative rapidity of change 
in this market, even that survey is slightly out of date.  The most recent sur-
veys by the NAIC come to the following findings: 
Five states have adopted the NAIC Model Act in a uniform and sub-
stantially similar manner . . . .  Thirteen states [have] adopted [at 
least] some portions of the NAIC Model Act.  [Other] states have 
undertaken “related state activity” in the area of life settlements.  In 
all, 44 states are identified as having adopted legislation relating to 
life settlements under state insurance law.  Among states that have 
recently enacted life-settlement related legislation, the majority have 
followed the NCOIL model act or have combined elements of the 
NAIC and NCOIL model acts.  The NAIC identifies approximately 
 
91 LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2(H)(1)(a)(x) (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007). 
92 LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 11(N) (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007). 
93 See 26 U.S.C. § 101(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (2010). 
94 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT §§ 8–9 (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009). 
95 Rev. Rul. 2009-13, 2009-21 I.R.B. 1029. 
96 See Tax Implications of Life Settlement Transactions, LIFE INS. SETTLEMENT ASS’N, 
http://www.thevoiceoftheindustry.com/content/42/Tax-Implications-of-Life-Settlement-
Transactions.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). 
97 See Heady, supra note 68, at 866–74. 
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30 states where life settlement legislation, including anti-STOLI leg-
islation, has been enacted since spring of 2008.  Of these, [fourteen] 
tracked the NCOIL model act provisions, and 12 states enacted hy-
brid legislation, combining elements of the NAIC and NCOIL model 
acts.98 
What is somewhat odd about these new restrictions enacted by the 
Model Act makers is that they appear to be similar to those enacted by the 
Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act of 190999—in that they are 
piecemeal legislation that does not address the whole market, with heavy, 
possibly criminal, sanctions attached—yet none seem to cite to the 1909 
Act.  It should also be noted that the criminal provisions in the 1909 Act 
went relatively unused; it is yet to be seen whether the NCOIL Model Act’s 
criminal provisions will suffer the same fate.100 
3.  New York vs. Delaware and the Quagmire of Disagreement 
The most recent developments in the U.S. insurable interest arena 
come not from statute, but rather from divergent state supreme court rulings 
in New York101 and Delaware,102 decided roughly one year apart.  The New 
York court dealt a fatal blow to the insurable interest doctrine in that juris-
diction.103  In contrast, the insurable interest doctrine not only endures in 
Delaware,104 but also is firmly declared to be a valid defense even after the 
 
98 SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASKFORCE REPORT 35 (July 22, 2010) 
[hereinafter SEC REPORT] (citation omitted), available at http://www.sec.gov/news 
/studies/2010/lifesettlements-report.pdf (citing two documents prepared by the NAIC: (i) an 
April 2010 NAIC Model Act state adoption table and (ii) a June 2010 viatical settle-
ments/STOLI legislation survey).  The five states that had adopted the NAIC Model Act in a 
uniform and substantially similar manner were Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, 
and West Virginia.  Id. at 35 n.163.  The thirteen states that had adopted at least some por-
tions of the NAIC Model Act were Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minne-
sota, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington.  Id. at 35 n.164.  
The states that had undertaken “related state activity” had adopted an older version of the 
NAIC Model Act, legislation or regulation derived from other sources, bulletins, and admin-
istrative rulings.  Id. at 35 n.165.  The SEC noted that of the 44 states identified by the NAIC 
as having adopted legislation relating to life settlements under state insurance law, a few 
“regulate only viaticals (sale of a life insurance policy by a person who is terminally or 
chronically ill) and not all life settlements.”  Id. at 35 n.166.  Additionally, as of July 22, 
2010, the date of the SEC’s report, 45 states had adopted legislation relating to life settle-
ments, as New Hampshire had just recently enacted life settlement legislation.  Id. 
99 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 12 (Eng.). 
100  See SUTTON, supra note 11, at 531. 
101 See Kramer, 940 N.E.2d 535. 
102 See Dawe, 28 A.3d 1059; Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. 
Trust, 28 A.3d 436 (Del. Sept. 20, 2011). 
103 See Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 542. 
104 See Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1073–74  (“Although the statute has been periodically updated, 
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expiration of a two-year contestability period for an insurance policy,105 as 
the Delaware Supreme Court describes in twin cases decided on the same 
day.  This rift among arguably the two most important states for the invest-
ment and creation of life and casualty insurance will likely create dramatic 
uncertainty in the market for insurance products, and offer insurers and in-
sureds an opportunity to structure even more complex insurance products to 
subvert the rulings. 
a.  New York & The Case of Arthur Kramer 
Notwithstanding many states’ adoptions according to the Model Acts, 
one important state stands apart from the rest: New York.  In the case of 
Kramer v. Phoenix Life Insurance Co., the New York Court of Appeals de-
termined that New York law permits a person to procure an insurance poli-
cy on her own life and immediately transfer it to one without an insurable 
interest in that life, even where the policy was obtained for the purpose of 
such an immediate transfer.106  In Kramer, Arthur Kramer—a prominent 
New York lawyer and founder of Kramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel LLP—
was approached by an insurance broker offering to turn life insurance poli-
cies into cash without any obligation on Kramer’s part.107  Kramer assented 
to the creation of two trusts that would later be funded with insurance poli-
cies issued on his life upon death.108  Two trusts were formed, with the in-
terest in those trusts initially issued in the names of Kramer’s children, for 
the purposes of procuring the life insurance that would fund the trust.109  
Immediately following the insurance purchases, the interests in those trusts 
were assigned, so as to reduce Kramer’s potential premium liability.110  Pol-
icy arguments in that court were three-fold, and similar to those we have 
seen throughout the history of the insurable interest requirement, as dis-
cussed above: (i) a policy obtained with the intent to assign to a party lack-
ing insurable interest violates statutory language; (ii) in accordance with the 
common law rule, an insured can only assign a policy if obtained in “good 
 
the substance of Delaware law on insurable interest has remained the same.  An insured is 
permitted to take out an insurance policy on his own life, but the law prohibits persons other 
than the insured from procuring or causing to be procured insurance, unless the benefits are 
payable to one holding an insurable interest in the insured’s life.”). 
105 See Schlanger, 28 A.3d at 441(“[I]f a life insurance policy lacks an insurable interest 
at inception, it is void ab initio because it violates Delaware’s clear public policy against 
wagering. . . .  As a result, the incontestability provision does not bar an insurer from assert-
ing a claim on the basis of a lack of insurable interest after the [ ]contestability period ex-
pires.”). 
106 Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 542. 
107 Id. at 537. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 538. 
110 Id. at 537–39. 
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faith” as a real insurance policy first; and  (iii) a person does not act of their 
own initiative if he or she obtains an insurance policy only at the suggestion 
of another. 111 
The New York Court of Appeals strongly put these arguments to rest 
by stating, “[t]here is simply no support in . . . [New York’s] statute [(N.Y. 
Ins. Law § 3205)] for . . . [the] . . . argument that a policy obtained by the 
insured with the intent of immediate assignment to a stranger is invalid.”112  
The New York court interpreted language in §3205(b) of New York’s In-
surance Law, which explicitly allows for “immediate transfer or assign-
ment”113 of a life insurance policy, as “evidently anticipat[ing] that an in-
sured might obtain a policy with the intent of assigning it, since one who 
‘immediately’ assigns a policy likely intends to assign it at the time of pro-
curement.”114  With such sweeping language, the “good faith” common law 
argument was also swept away—as the court read any “good faith” re-
quirement out of the statutory language, which so manifestly allowed for 
immediate assignment.115  Finally, the court does not allow for the argument 
that the insured must make the policy of his or her own initiative by stating, 
“[t]he initiative requirement, without more, does not prohibit an insured 
from obtaining a policy pursuant to a non-coercive arrangement with an in-
vestor.”116 
The dissent, on the other hand, asserts standard public policy concerns 
against wagering.117  These concerns, however, seem to have lost favor with 
the court, as evidenced by the majority opinion in Kramer, and, by exten-
sion, the New York State Legislature.  In fact, the dissent admits, “[i]n a 
sense, of course, all insurance is a bet, but for most of us who buy life in-
 
111 Id. at 540. 
112 Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 541. 
     113 N.Y. Ins. Law § 3205 (McKinney 2007). 
114 Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 541. 
115 Id. at 542.  
In light of the overwhelming textual and historical evidence that the Legislature in-
tended to allow the immediate assignment of a policy by an insured to one lacking 
an insurable interest, we are not persuaded by plaintiff and the insurers’ argument 
that section 3205(b) is limited by the common law requirement that an insured 
cannot obtain a life insurance policy with the intent of circumventing the insurable 
interest rule by immediately assigning it to a third party.  To the extent that there is 
any conflict, the common law has been modified by un-ambiguous statutory lan-
guage.  
 Id. (citations omitted). 
116 Id. at 541. (addressing the following language in the dissenting opinion: “My view of 
New York law is that where, as in this case, an insured purchases a policy on his own life for 
no other purpose than to facilitate a wager by someone with no insurable interest, the trans-
action is unlawful.” (Smith, J., dissenting)). 
117 Id. at 543–44 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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surance it is a bet we are happy to lose.”118  The dissent goes on to lay out 
the logic behind immediate transfer transactions as driven by “a belief that 
the insured’s life expectancy is less than what the insurance company thinks 
it is.”119  The dissent also makes clear that this is a point about risk, and that 
the risk of knowledge about health is the issue.120  The dissent states that 
“we may be . . . confident that the purchasers in this case thought, probably 
with good reason, that they knew something about Arthur Kramer’s health 
that the insurance companies did not know.”121  Thus, the dissent adopts the 
position that insurance policies should be freely assignable with one excep-
tion: “where the insured, at the moment he acquires the policy, is in sub-
stance acting for a third party who wants to bet on the insured’s death,”122 
as a “cloak for a wager.”123  Thus, in New York, where even the dissent ac-
cepts most treatments of life insurance as a piece of property, the weakness 
of the insurable interest doctrine is evident.  Presciently, the dissent ends 
with, “insurable interest rules, as our opinions in this case surely demon-
strate, are tricky to handle.”124 
To be clear, the NCOIL Model Act was drafted to penalize just this 
type of transaction.125  The NCOIL recommended, in 2007, that “states 
should consider adopting an amendment to their insurable interest laws, if 
necessary, to provide additional protection against trust-initiated STOLI and 
other schemes involving a cloak . . . .”126  The National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the NCCUSL) seems to be in a bit 
of a tension with the NCOIL over this point, as the former seeks to explicit-
ly amend the Uniform Trade Code (the UTC) to allow not only for the use 
of such trust instruments, but also for the additional protection afforded by 
these trusts being linked to an individual who would have (as opposed to an 
individual who has) an insurable interest according to common law consan-
guinity.127  This amendment came about because the definition of insurable 
interest became a matter of widespread concern among trust and estate 
planners after Chawla v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Co.,128 
 
118 Id. at 544. 
119 Id. 
120 Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 544. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 543. 
123 Id. at 559. 
124 Id. at 546. 
125 See LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, first drafting note (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 
2007). 
126 Id. 
127 See INSURABLE INTEREST AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE §113(b) (Nat’l 
Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2010), available at http://www.law. up-
enn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/iirta/2010final.pdf. 
128 No. CIV.A. 03-CV-1215, 2005 WL 405405 (E.D. Va. Feb. 3, 2005), aff’d in part, va-
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where a Virginia federal district court applying Maryland law held that a 
trust did not have an insurable interest in the life of the insured who was the 
settlor and creator of the trust.129  This Chawla problem permeates various 
areas of insurance law and presents several legal and moral problems for 
policy makers. 
The NCCUSL appears to be engaging in a standard interpretive ma-
neuver—as to insurable interest, at least—of expanding the definition of an 
insurable interest to fix a common law determination that puts certain per-
sons outside that definition.  The NCCUSL states, “if on the date the policy 
is issued the trustee has an insurable interest in the individual whose life is 
insured, the policy is not subject to being declared void for lack of such an 
interest.”130  However, the UTC revision attempts to establish, “the re-
quirement that the proceeds of a life insurance policy used to fund the trust 
be payable primarily to certain types of trust beneficiaries.”131  Thus, as cur-
rently drafted, the UTC allows an insurable interest to vest in a trust at the 
time of inception, while the UTC amendment provides only that the “pro-
ceeds” from a life insurance policy be payable to certain types of beneficiar-
ies.  An issue with the amendment’s limitation is that it is unclear whether 
the limitation applies at the time of the formation of the trust and insurance 
policy or thereafter.  Indeed, regardless of when the limitation applies, the 
proceeds always have the likelihood of being paid out to any designated or 
assigned individual, regardless of his or her insurable interest, after the time 
that a state contestability period has run. 
Kramer and the UTC Amendments together appear to merely be con-
tinuing the gradual evisceration of the insurable interest doctrine in the 
United States.  Indeed, in New York, the doctrine seems to be completely 
eviscerated—however, a series of complex procedures (like those in Kra-
mer) are still required to work around the insurable interest doctrine.  Such 
gradual evisceration in “an ever-broadening approach to insurable inter-
ests,” merely creates massive transaction costs and uncertainty for individu-
als seeking to alienate their life insurance as property.132 
b.  Delaware & A Strong Comeback for Insurable Interest 
In 2011, the Delaware Supreme Court was presented in the case of 
PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust with 
 
cated in part, 440 F.3d 639 (4th Cir. 2006). 
129 Id. at *6. 
130 INSURABLE INTEREST AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE §113, cmt., ll. 13–
15 (Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2010). 
131 Id. at ll. 40–41. 
132 Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 400, 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (indicating that a 
federal court sitting in diversity ought not to disturb a complex and wide-ranging state stat-
ute). 
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three questions of law certified by the U.S. District of Delaware.133  First, 
whether Delaware law permitted an insurer to challenge the validity of a life 
insurance policy based on a lack of insurable interest after the expiration of 
a two-year contestability period required by Delaware statute.134  Second, 
whether Delaware law permits an insured from procuring a policy on his or 
her own life with the intent to immediately transfer that policy, or a benefi-
cial interest in a trust that owns and is the beneficiary of the policy, to a per-
son without an insurable interest in the insured’s life.135  Third, whether 
Delaware law confers upon the trustee of a Delaware trust established by an 
individual insured an insurable interest in the life of that individual when, at 
the time of the application for life insurance, the insured intends that bene-
ficial interest in the Delaware trust to be transferred to a third-party investor 
with no insurable interest in the individual’s life following the issuance of 
the life insurance policy.136  On each of these questions, the Delaware court 
came out strongly on the side of solidifying the insurable interest doctrine’s 
survival in Delaware. 
On the first question, the Delaware court explained, “[a]n incontesta-
bility clause is a contractual provision wherein the insurer agrees that, after 
a policy has been in force for a given period of time, that it will not contest 
the policy based on misrepresentations in the insurance application.”137 His-
torically, such clauses were introduced because “insureds sometimes paid 
premiums for a long period of time only to have the insurer declare the con-
tract void because of [innocent and minor] misrepresentations in the appli-
cation.”138  Counteracting such negative consequences, incontestability 
clauses function as a sort of statute of limitation and repose, “provid[ing] 
security in financial planning for the insured, while also providing an insur-
er a reasonable opportunity to investigate any misrepresentations in the ap-
plication.”139  Today, forty-three states have adopted mandatory incontesta-
bility clauses relating to life insurance policies, while four states have also 
adopted incontestability clauses relating to other types of insurance.140  
Thus, incontestability clauses have become an industry standard.141 
In answering the first question, the Delaware Supreme Court employed 
a fraud in the factum theory,142 and essentially granted a permanent option 
 




137 Id. at 1065. 
138 Id. 
139 28 A.3d at 1065. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 1067 (“As with all contracts, fraud in the inducement renders a life insurance 
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to insurance companies, allowing insurers to check the validity of an insur-
able interest in an insurance policy at any time, by stating: 
Under Delaware common law, if a life insurance policy lacks an in-
surable interest at inception, it is void ab initio because it violates 
Delaware’s clear public policy against wagering.  It follows, there-
fore, that if no insurance policy ever legally came into effect, then 
neither did any of its provisions, including the statutorily required in-
contestability clause.143 
This statement of policy, while seemingly meager on its face, creates a 
clear advantage for insurance companies over insureds or consumers.  Un-
der this standard, if an insurance company feels that its investment in an in-
sured is not meeting the actuarial standards the company determined at the 
outset of a policy, then the insurance company can challenge the validity of 
that policy at any time for any misrepresentation relating to possible flaws 
in the statement of an insurable interest at inception.  Thus, a clear message 
has been sent out to investors in the life insurance market—stay out, or face 
the near certainty of a protracted legal battle that will invalidate your in-
vestment vehicle.  The permanency of this option creates an invaluable ad-
vantage for insurers, as insurers are more likely to challenge a policy the 
more unprofitable the policy looks.  Indeed, a perverse incentive is created 
to see how low the price of a policy can go, before an insurance company 
essentially “shorts” the policy and moves for invalidation in the court sys-
tem to save money in precise congruence to the losses it is experiencing be-
tween the actuarial value of the policy at its outset and the value of the poli-
cy at the time of challenge. 
In answering the second question presented to it, the Delaware Su-
preme Court attempted to blunt the impact of its answer to the first question 
by allowing an insured the right to take out a policy with the intent to im-
mediately transfer the policy, but the court also limited such right to “bona 
fide sales of [a] policy taken out in good faith.”144  The court explained that: 
 
policy voidable at the election of the innocent party.  Certain agreements, however, are so 
egregiously flawed that they are void at the outset.  These arrangements are often referred to 
as void ab initio . . . .  Fraud in the factum occurs when a party makes a misrepresentation 
that is regarded as going to the very character of the proposed contract itself, as when one 
party induces the other to sign a document by falsely stating that it has no legal effect.  If the 
misrepresentation is of this type, then there is no contact at all, or what is sometimes anoma-
lously described as void, as opposed to voidable, contract.”). 
143 Id. at 1067–68.  The Schlanger case uses identical reasoning to the Dawe case.  See 
Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 436, 441 (Del. Sept. 
20, 2011) (“Under Delaware common law, if a life insurance policy lacks an insurable inter-
est at inception, it is void ab initio because it violates Delaware’s clear public policy against 
wagering.” (internal citation omitted)). 
144 Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1076. 
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[I]f a third party financially induces the insured to procure a life in-
surance contract with the intent to immediately transfer the policy to 
a third party, the contract lacks an insurable interest. . . .  The rele-
vant inquiry is who procured the policy and whether or not that per-
son meets the insurable interest requirements.145 
Thus, the court created a rather difficult-to-enforce standard which said, “if 
a third party funds the premium payments by providing the insured the fi-
nancial means to purchase the policy then the insured does not procure or 
affect the policy.”146  The Delaware Supreme Court also distinguished the 
Kramer case as being “decided on a narrow set of issues applying unique 
New York insurance statutes.”147  However, the statutory distinction made 
by the Delaware court is somewhat inapposite to the broad policy statement 
made by the Kramer court that individuals are considered to take life poli-
cies out of their own initiative, even if assisted by an investor.148  The Del-
aware court rightly noted that “after Kramer the New York legislature re-
vised the state’s insurance laws”149 to prohibit persons from “directly or 
indirectly engag[ing] in any act, practice or arrangement that constitutes 
stranger-originated life insurance.”150  However, this notation does not viti-
ate the New York court’s reasoning in the absence of such a knee-jerk ban 
on transactions.  It should also be of some note that the Delaware court’s 
broad statement that the New York statutory change in effect “limit[s] the 
precedential value of Kramer,”151 is inapposite inasmuch as prohibiting 
STOLI transactions may be related to but is fundamentally different from 
allowing immediate assignment of policies. 
This standard the Delaware Supreme Court laid down is rife with prob-
lems.  First, it is difficult to enforce.  Second, in light of an insurance com-
pany’s ability to inspect issues dealing with insurable interest at any time, 
financial transactions that were sound enough to create an insurable interest 
at the inception of a contract, may be viewed as illogical by a court five, 
ten, or fifty years after the inception of a policy.  When an insured is long 
dead, it becomes particularly difficult to glean his or her intent, or to discern 
how certain cash flows that may seem to lack an insurable interest in fact do 
so.  For example, if an individual procures a loan from a friend (or a bank) 
that funds the individual’s purchase of a life insurance policy in 2011, but 
 
145 Id. (“Stated differently, if an insured procures a policy as a mere cover for a wager, 
then the insurable interest requirement is not satisfied.”). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 1075. 
148 See Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 541. 
149 Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1075.  
150 N.Y. INS. LAW § 7815 (McKinney 2007). 
151 Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1075.  
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the individual later sells that policy because he cannot pay the loan back to 
the same friend (or bank) that gave him or her the loan, then the policy 
looks like it lacked an insurable interest at its inception.  However, suppose 
that those are the only facts that a court has after the individual is deceased 
in 2051; then, it looks like the friend (or bank) funded the initial premiums 
of the policy.  In essence, the Delaware court was left with the same struc-
turing issues it had before it decided question number two.  Once more, the 
assertion of an insurable interest doctrine creates litigation uncertainty that 
favors insurance companies over an insured or an investor in an insurance 
policy.  Allowing an individual to later transfer the policy, as the Delaware 
court did, is a half-measure that has all the same problems of a very strictly-
enforced insurable interest policy. 
As to the third question, relating to trusts, the Delaware Supreme Court 
takes a further half-measure to protect the insurable interest doctrine.  The 
court stated: 
Where the individual insured creates a trust to hold a life insurance 
policy on his life and funds the trust with that policy or with money 
to pay its premiums then the trustee152 has the same insurable interest 
that the settlor153 has in his own life.  Thus we only inquire whether 
the owner (either the insured or the trust) has an insurable interest in 
the insured’s life at the policy’s inception and not whether the bene-
ficiaries of the policy have an insurable interest.  If the individual in-
sured creates and initially funds the trust, then the trustee has an in-
surable interest without regard to how the trust beneficiaries obtained 
their interest.154 
This statement of law does not necessarily solve the problem that the 
Delaware court sought to solve in its answers to the first two questions as-
serting the strength of the insurable interest doctrine.  Rather, this third re-
sponse will serve to alter the way the market is structured for investment in 
life insurance.  Individuals seeking to create a marketable financial product 
with their life insurance policies will now need simply to create a trust, cre-
ate the appearance of an insurable interest in an insured’s life at the incep-
tion of a policy, then fund the trust with that policy, followed by allowing 
individuals—regardless of their affiliation with the insured—to procure 
beneficial interests in the trust.  The trust mechanism ruling only serves to 
allow the market for “cloaks” to flourish by allowing stranger investors in 
life insurance through the door of trust law and not insurance law.  This rul-
 
152 A trustee is an individual who represents a fiduciary legal interest for the trust and its 
execution. 
153 A settlor is the creator of a trust who funds the initial trust corpus. 
154 Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1075.   
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ing, however, does avoid the Chawla problem155 of a trust not having an in-
surable interest in the life of the insured, even when the insured was the set-
tlor and creator of the trust.156  Here, a trust can have an insurable interest. 
The enforcement mechanism that the Delaware Supreme Court created 
is similar to that in its response to the second certified question presented: 
“In cases where a third party either directly or indirectly funds the premium 
payments as part of a pre-negotiated arrangement with the insured to imme-
diately transfer ownership, the policy fails at its inception for a lack of in-
surable interest.”157  Not only is this enforcement mechanism difficult to 
discern through decades-old financial statements, but it also creates a cur-
rent problem.  Since individuals now are disallowed from procuring insur-
ance policies funded by a third party, either directly or indirectly, persons 
seeking to invest in the life insurance market will engage in a black market 
for investment in such policies.  That black market will be created by un-
spoken agreements to fund the inception of life insurance policies, thus arti-
ficially creating the appearance of an insurable interest.  Therefore, what is 
allowed to be express and written down under New York law—that is, that 
an insurance policy is intended for immediate transfer—must remain un-
spoken under Delaware law.158 
Furthermore, even if the Delaware ruling is completely enforceable, it 
limits investment in life insurance policies to the wealthy, or to those indi-
viduals who can bona fide purchase expensive life insurance policies for 
later sale.  Suppose a person of lower financial means desired to enter the 
market for life insurance because he or she is of current good health and 
needs an investment that will yield cash quickly.  If the Delaware ruling 
were taken to its logical conclusion, this person would have to take out an 
insurance policy and pay all of its premiums up front in the hopes that an 
investor would purchase the policy at a later date.  Taken one step further, if 
this individual did not have the money to purchase the policy now, and 
sought a loan for the payment of the proceeds, so that he can later cash it 
out, such a loan would look like an attempt by a third party to induce the 
purchase of an insurance policy, which may lead to its invalidation at a later 
date.  Thus, derivatively, the market for loans to help low-income individu-
als procure life insurance will dry up due to the legal uncertainty now asso-
 
155 See supra Part II.C.3.a. 
156 Chawla, 2005 WL 405405. 
157 Dawe, 28 A.3d at 1078. 
158 It should be noted that this scenario in life-policy loan industry has recently come un-
der scrutiny in Florida.  See Leslie Scism, Life-Policy Loans Under Scrutiny, Wall St. J., Oct. 
4, 2011, at C1 (“Federal and state courts long have upheld consumers’ rights to sell their pol-
icies to outside investors.  What insurers say sets . . . [life-policy loans] apart from these 
longstanding policy sales is the role of agents and other commission-based middlemen in 
allegedly inducing older people to take out policies with the intent to sell them.”). 
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ciated with an unlimited ability by insurance companies to challenge the in-
surable interest underlying an insurance policy.  Logically, then, if individ-
uals of lower financial means learn of the legal uncertainty associated with 
such a market, they will either be driven out, or they will be exploited by 
persons who induce them to use whatever means they have to pay for the 
premiums of a policy now, on unwritten promises that these persons will 
purchase the policy after the applicable contestability period has run. 
It should be clear from the above analysis that while the Delaware Su-
preme Court had good intentions in strengthening the insurable interest doc-
trine to prevent wagers, its decision merely created a market where what 
can be in writing in New York—due to Kramer—has been relegated to the 
status of a sub rosa black market.  Not only does the Dawe ruling create an 
internal investment problem for the life insurance market within Delaware, 
but it also creates interstate uncertainty, as a severe conflict of law is creat-
ed between Delaware and New York’s standards for the insurance market.  
With its ruling in Dawe, Delaware also falls behind its peer capital markets 
in England and Australia, which have engaged in the modernization of their 
insurance markets by eliminating the insurable interest doctrine and, thus, 
streamlining regulation of the markets. 
III.  A DOCTRINE CREATES A MARKET:  INSURABLE INTEREST 
AND THE LIFE SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 
A.  The Secondary Life Insurance General Market Structure and Size 
The legal structure described in Part II lays the groundwork for the 
modern market for secondary life insurance, where most interesting ques-
tions about insurable interest dwell.  This part will seek to explain how le-
gal tools are used to create the life settlement market, the structure of which 
is driven primarily by the insurable interest doctrine.  This part will also 
seek to show that the insurable interest doctrine causes market contortions 
that create unnecessary transaction costs without any payoff. 
The need for cash flow by insurance policy holders has created the 
three different types of life settlement products discussed above: viatical 
settlements,159 life settlements, and pure stranger-originated life insurance.  
 
159 This interesting nomenclature of “viatical settlement” was traced by the Fourth Circuit 
fairly recently in Life Partners, Inc. v. Morrison:  
A “viaticum” in ancient Rome was a purse containing money and provisions for a 
journey.  A viatical settlement, by which a dying person is able to acquire provi-
sions for the remainder of his life’s journey by selling his life insurance policy, is 
thus thought to provide a viaticum.  In the language of the industry, the insured is 
the “viator,” who sells his policy at a discount to a “provider” of the viaticum.   
484 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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A more recent iteration on the life settlement market is stranger-originated 
annuity transactions, which function in essentially the same way as the oth-
er three products, with the exception that the underlying insurance product 
is an annuity.160  Viatical settlements are important because they are viewed 
as the beginning of the modern market for secondary life insurance poli-
cies.161  As the AIDS epidemic raged on in the 1980s, medical care became 
increasingly expensive, while individuals with AIDS had predictably short 
life spans.162  Thus, many individuals with AIDS who had life insurance 
policies sought to cash out the policies and avoid paying their premiums by 
alienating their estate’s rights to collect the death benefit of the policies.163  
In essentially the same manner as previously described,164 an investor (or 
group of investors) would pay the insured a sum discounted from the face 
value of the policy, but more than the cash-surrender value.  In return for an 
up-front cash value, as well as a guarantee that the premiums for the insur-
ance policy will be paid, the insured (or the insured’s beneficiaries) transfer 
the right to collect the death benefit to the investors.  Viatical settlements 
qualify as a distinct category because they are generally regarded to be 
properly issued to individuals with (a) an illness; and (b) 24 months or less 
left on their life expectancy.165  Life Settlements, on the other hand, are is-
sued to individuals with greater than 24 months to live.166  Generally, these 
settlement transactions are engaged in with a growing group of elderly indi-
viduals and retiring baby boomers who already have high net worth but are 
seeking cash.  The legal structure of life settlements does not differ in any 
material respect from viatical settlements. 
Stranger-originated life insurance policies engage with trust law in an 
interesting way.  These policies engage in various ways to thwart the insur-
able interest doctrine.  They are generally structured as follows: (1) an in-
vestor induces a person, typically falling into the viatical or life settlement 
category, to purchase a life insurance policy that the person likely would 
not have otherwise purchased; (2) the person applies for the policy (becom-
ing the insured) with the prior understanding that he or she will cede control 
of the policy to the investor; (3) the investor and the insured agree that at 
the end of a state’s contestability period for an insurance policy, ownership 
of the policy will be transferred to the investor, or some third party, who 
 
160 INSURABLE INTEREST AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE §113(b) (Nat’l 
Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2010). 
161 See Life Partners, Inc. v, 484 F.3d at 287. 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
165 SEC REPORT, supra note 98, at n.2. 
166 Id. 
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expects to receive the death benefit when the insured dies.167  The two par-
ties must wait the duration of the contestability period provided for insur-
ance policies by a state—typically two years—before transferring the poli-
cy, because during that time insurance companies may seek to have the 
policies judicially invalidated for want of an insurable interest.168  General-
ly, after the contestability period of a life insurance policy runs, the insurer 
is prohibited from contesting the policy based on misrepresentations by the 
insured.169 
Conning Research and Consulting, Inc., an insurance industry observ-
er, reports on the life settlements industry and produces an annual study.  In 
2007, Conning Research estimated that the market, then estimated at $12 
billion in face amount of life insurance settled,170 would grow to $90–$140 
billion in face amount settled by 2016.171  Conning Research later estimated 
that $11.7 billion of face amount in life insurance was settled in 2008,172 
putting growth in the market from 2007 to 2008 at slightly below zero.  
BusinessWeek estimated the market for unwanted life insurance policies at 
$15 billion in face amount during 2008.173  More recently, the amount set-
tled has declined due to the economic recession of 2008.  Conning Research 
estimated that $8 billion of life insurance face value settled in 2009,174 
while annual volume dropped to $3.8 billion face in 2010, reflecting sus-
tained buyer’s market conditions.175  Even if these estimates are off by sev-
eral magnitudes, it is clear that there is massive market demand for such 
products, even despite the massive drop in the face value of such products 
in 2010. 
 
167 See SEC REPORT, supra note 98, at 11. 
168 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 2, § 240:1. 
169 Id. 
170 Press Release, Conning Research and Consulting, Life Settlements—New Challenges 
to Growth (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.conning.com/pressreleasedetail. 
aspx?id=154. 
171 See Sam Rosenfeld, Life Settlements: Signposts to a Principal Asset Class 3 (Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center, Working Paper No. 09-20), available at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/09/0920.pdf (citing Conning Research and Consult-
ing’s 2007 publication LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET: INCREASING INVESTOR AND CAPITAL 
DEMAND). 
172 Press Release, Conning Research and Consulting, Life Settlements: A Buyers’ Market 
for Now (Oct. 8, 2009), available at www.conning.com/pressrelease-detail.aspx?id=3447. 
173 Matthew Goldstein, Why Death Bonds Look so Frail, BUS. WK. (Feb. 25, 2008, 5:00 
PM), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_08/b4072040348943.htm. 
174 Press Release, Conning Research and Consulting, U.S. Life Settlements Annual Vol-
ume Dropped 36% in 2009 (Oct. 28, 2010), available at www.conning.com/pressrelease-
detail.aspx?id=4818. 
175 Press Release, Conning Research and Consulting, Life Settlements: An Asset Class 
Resets (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.conning.com/pressrelease-detail.aspx? 
id=5971. 
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B.  Actors Effectuating the Mechanics of Subverting the Insurable Interest 
Law 
 In order to get around insurable interest laws effectively, a number of 
market intermediaries become necessary to effectuate the secondary life in-
surance market.  Although life settlement transactions may be termed in the 
above three different ways (viatical settlements, life settlements, and 
STOLI), they typically involve an insured individual, or the owner of the 
policy, a producer who may be a financial advisor or an insurance agent, 
one or more settlement brokers who may also be insurance agents, one or 
more life expectancy underwriters, one or more providers who typically 
represent the party acquiring the policy, and one or more investors.176  A 
2010 Securities and Exchange (“SEC”) Report on this subject provides a 

















As the SEC image illustrates, the number of actors involved in the cre-
ation of just one single life insurance transaction make transaction costs in 
this area high, as parties to the investment must go through several interme-
diaries in order to transact in the sphere.  But, the SEC characterization does 
not capture all of the relevant actors in the life settlement, viatical settle-
ment, and stranger-originated life insurance markets,178 which include: the 
insured,179 owner,180 broker,181 provider,182 investment agent,183 purchas-
 
176 See SEC REPORT, supra note 98, at 6. 
177 Id. 
178 See generally Heady, supra note 68. 
179 “[T]he person covered under the policy being considered for sale in [the secondary 
market for life insurance],” is generally referred to as the ‘insured.’  LIFE SETTLEMENTS 
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er,184 financing entity,185 special purpose entity,186 and life insurance pro-
 
MODEL ACT § 2I (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007). 
180 “[T]he owner of a life insurance policy or a certificate holder under a group policy, 
with or without terminal illness, who enters or seeks to enter into [a settlement on the sec-
ondary market for the benefits of their life insurance policy]” is the ‘owner.’  Id. § 2N; see 
also VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2T (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009). 
181 The broker is “a Person who, on behalf of an Owner [or viator] and for a fee, commis-
sion or other valuable consideration, offers or attempts to negotiate [the settlement] between 
an Owner [or viator] and [settlement] Providers.”  LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2B 
(Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007); see also VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2M 
(Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009). 
182 The provider is “a person, other than an Owner [or viator], who enters into or effectu-
ates a [settlement on the secondary market for life insurance] with an Owner [or viator].”  
LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2S (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007); see also 
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2P (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009). 
183 The investment agent is “a person who is an appointed or contracted agent of a li-
censed . . . provider who solicits or arranges the funding for the purchase of a viatical settle-
ment [or life settlement] by a viatical settlement [or life settlement] purchaser and who is 
acting on behalf of a viatical settlement [or life settlement] provider.”  VIATICAL 
SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2O (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2009). 
184 As the Life Settlements Model Act explains: 
A Person who pays compensation or anything of value as consideration for a bene-
ficial interest in a trust which is vested with, or for the assignment, transfer or sale 
of, an ownership or other interest in a life insurance policy or a certificate issued 
pursuant to a group life insurance policy which has been the subject of a [settle-
ment on the secondary market for life insurance],  
is known as the “purchaser.”  LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2U (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Leg-
islators 2007); see also VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2R(1) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs 2009). 
185  As the Life Settlements Model Act explains: 
[A]n underwriter, placement agent, lender, purchaser of securities, purchaser of a 
policy or certificate from a Provider, credit enhancer, or any entity that has a direct 
ownership in a policy or certificate that is the subject of a [settlement on the sec-
ondary market for life insurance] . . . whose principal activity related to the trans-
action is providing funds to effect the [settlement] or purchase one or more of the 
policies; and  . . . who has an agreement in writing with one or more Providers to 
finance the acquisition of [settlements for life insurance on the secondary market], 
is deemed the “financing entity.”  LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2F (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. 
Legislators 2007); see also VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2E(1) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs 2009).  Investors or purchasers who are non-accredited are not considered financ-
ing entities.  VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2E(2) (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 
2009); LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2F (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007). 
186  
A corporation, partnership, trust, limited liability company, or other legal entity 
formed solely to provide either directly or indirectly access to institutional capital 
markets . . . for a financing entity or provider; or . . . in connection with a transac-
tion in which the securities in the special purpose entity are acquired by the owner 
or by a “qualified institutional buyer;”  




In an effort to get around insurable interest laws, these actors coalesce 
typically around individual insured persons as the locus of activity.  Arthur 
Kramer’s case illustrates how these actors function with each other in a 
highly complex dance with trust law to shield the insurance policies from 
the insurable interest hurdle:188 (1) Steven Lockwood (acting as the broker), 
the principal of Lockwood Pension Services, approached Mr. Kramer to so-
licit his participation in a stranger-owned life insurance arrangement; (2) 
two trusts were created (acting as the special purpose entities) to hold insur-
ance policies issued by the three insurance companies; (3) an employee of 
the insurance broker was named trustee of the trust; (4) several children of 
Kramer (the insured), or other persons with an insurable interest, were 
named as beneficiaries of the trusts; (5) the trusts were then funded with in-
surance policies (from a provider), with death benefits in the millions of 
dollars; (6) after the trusts were formed and funded, the beneficiaries of the 
trusts then assigned their beneficial interests to a stranger investor (the pur-
chaser), relatively immediately.189  Typically, financing is arranged so that 
the premiums for the insurance policy are paid first by the insured—through 
loans provided by financing entity, and solicited by an investment agent—
then paid by investors after the transfer is effectuated. 
As the above explanation elucidates, in order for consumers to effec-
tively seek cash-out of an insurance policy, or the market potential for such 
a policy, they must go through a series of legal slights of hand to get at 
those monies.  Even for an investor to capitalize on the earning potential of 
an investment in life insurance policies, it must put an individual on the 
hook (with the consonant ramifications of default) for premium payments in 
the interim, if not long-term.  Thus, in contrast to investment in other prod-
uct types, where the equity in the product stands alone, investment in an in-
 
or “the securities pay a fixed rate of return commensurate with established asset-backed in-
stitutional capital markets,” is defined a “special purpose entity.”  LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL 
ACT § 2X (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 2007). 
187 “Any person licensed . . .  as a resident or nonresident insurance producer who has 
received qualification or authority for life insurance coverage or a life line of coverage pur-
suant” to the applicable statutes in each state in which they operate is considered a “life in-
surance producer.”  LIFE SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2K (Nat’l Conf. of Ins. Legislators 
2007); see also VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 2G (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 
2009). 
188 See Kramer, 940 N.E.2d at 536–37. 
189 There is a question here in many states about “good faith,” and whether an insurable 
interest policy should be upheld if it was not taken out in good faith by the insured.  Howev-
er, STOLI structurings typically wait for the completion of a contestability period to transfer.  
As reflected in Kramer, the New York system does not consider good faith and allows poli-
cies to be immediately transferred.  See id. at 541–42.  But see N.Y. INS LAW § 7815 
(McKinney 2007) (“No person shall directly or indirectly engage in any act, practice or ar-
rangement that constitutes stranger-originated life insurance.”). 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:93 (2011) 
126 
surance product requires that you have some legal interest in the continu-
ance of the product.  Indeed, if the insurable interest doctrine existed in oth-
er spheres, the idea of “shorting” a stock might seem morally abhorrent as a 
bet against a product creating a negative interest in the particular item. 
C.  How Insurable Interest Functions in Indemnity Policies 
The indemnity principle differentiates life insurance policies as non-
indemnity policies from those that are strictly indemnity policies to remu-
nerate for the value of lost property.190  The indemnity line of insurance is 
the sister strand to life insurance, and it was the one first regulated by Eng-
lish statute, as discussed above.191  “The notion that the purpose of insur-
ance is to protect the insured against suffering a loss, not to create the op-
portunity for gain,” forms the basis for why an insurable interest doctrine 
exists for insurance policies relating to property.192  In contrast to contesta-
bility periods for life insurance, indemnity policies have stricter construc-
tions in the courts than those for life insurance.193  Most courts hold that an 
indemnifying insurer cannot be estopped to assert that there was no insura-
ble interest at all and cannot be held to have waived the requirement194—a 
stark contrast to the life insurance industry’s statutorily mandated contesta-
bility period.195  Indeed, courts permit an indemnifying insurer to question 
the extent of an insurable interest after a loss has occurred in order to guard 
against over-insuring.196 
There are four different tests for insurable interest in a piece of proper-
ty.197  First, a legal or equitable interest in property will always suffice, sub-
ject sometimes to the condition that the interest have at least some value.198  
However, while the legal interest doctrine prevailed historically, a second 
“factual expectations” test has emerged over time to allow an insurable in-
terest to vest if the beneficiary expects to derive actual economic gain from 
the property’s continued existence.199  Third, a contract right that depends 
 
190 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 201 (4th ed. 2005). 
191 See supra Part II. 
192 ABRAHAM, supra note 190 (citing the twin English acts of 1746 and 1774 in establish-
ing this notion). 
193 Id. at 202. 
194 Id. 
195 Statutorily mandated contestability periods are usually two years in length.  See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2908 (2011) (“There shall be a provision that the policy shall be 
incontestable after it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of not 
more than 2 years after its date of issue . . . .”). 
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on the continued existence of property also supports an insurable interest in 
that property.200  Finally, the potential for suffering legal liability for the de-
struction of property will support an insurable interest in that property.201  
One can notice that these tests bear a very close resemblance to those in the 
English system.202 
While one might assume that the insurable interest tests in the indem-
nity area would be clearer than any for life insurance, as contracts for prop-
erty involve measurable losses, they are not actually so.  The four tests for 
insurable interest in indemnity are muddy fact-based determinations akin to 
the “blood or affinity” tests or “pecuniary interest” tests developed in the 
non-indemnity arena.  Indeed, it can be said that it is even more difficult to 
determine who has an insurable interest in a piece of property insured, than 
in the life of an individual insured.203  The space between the “factual ex-
pectation” and “legal interest” tests creates an opportunity for individuals to 
exploit the insurable interest doctrine as it is applied in the different states. 
D. Litigation Costs due to the Insurable Interest Doctrine 
Yet another transaction cost created by the insurable interest doctrine 
is long, drawn-out litigation and its attendant substantial uncertainty as to 
the result.  Insurable interest generally gets litigated only if the following 
three things happen: (i) the insurance company has issued the policy and the 
insured represented at the time of issuance to having an insurable interest; 
(ii) the contestability period has run on those representations by the insured; 
and (iii) the insured event has happened, or is very close to happening.204  If 
the policy does not pay out, and it is surrendered for its cash value, or it 
lapses altogether, an insurance company will likely not litigate the insurable 
interest issue.  Currently, the majority of states have no requirement that an 
insurance company disclose to an insured that there is a life settlement op-
tion prior to permitting the lapse or surrender of a life insurance policy.205  
Six states require insurance companies to inform senior citizens or the 
chronically ill who are about to surrender life insurance policies for cash 
value, or let the policies lapse entirely, about the option of privately selling 
that asset to a third party in a life settlement transaction.206 
 
Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L. J. 474, 486 (2007). 
200 See ABRAHAM, supra note 190, at 202 (noting that secured creditors fall into this cate-
gory). 
201 Id. (citing Vill. of Constantine v. Home Ins. Co., 427 F.2d 1338 (6th Cir. 1970)). 
202 See supra Part II.A and Part II.B. 
203 JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 82 (3d Ed. 1996). 
204 Id. 
205 SEC REPORT, supra note 98, at 7. 
206 The six states are California, Kentucky, Maine, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.  
Id. at 7 n.29. 
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Insurance companies will often assert the insurable interest doctrine as 
a defense to being compelled to pay out an insurance policy that has vest-
ed.207  Thus, insurance companies have a very high incentive to maintain 
the doctrine, and its concomitant transaction costs, instead of writing insur-
able interest considerations into their underwriting policies up-front.  The 
insurable interest defense essentially acts as an embedded option built into 
insurance policies.208  If an insured event never happens, the option is use-
less, but the insurer does not need to pay out on the policy anyway.  If the 
insured event happens, the insurer can assert the defense—after the contest-
ability period has run—and, in effect, get a second chance at invalidating 
the policy after more information has been gained and premiums have been 
paid into the insurers coffers.  If the insurable interest doctrine defense is 
successful, the insurer need only pay back premiums, but retains the value 
of the death benefit—creating massive cost savings.  Thus, the option value 
increases as the probability of invalidation increases,209 with the caveat that 
there is some uncertainty about whether or not the insurer will be able to 
convince a court that no insurable interest exists—this determination will be 
made according to murky fact-based tests.210  But, even that litigation un-
certainty works in favor of the insurable interest doctrine as a defense be-
cause, even in the most strained scenarios, factually uncertain tests are still 
worthwhile for an insurance company to submit to, as they create some 
probability of invalidation.  Thus, most of the benefit of the insurable inter-
est doctrine accretes to the insurance company—with very little in terms of 
social welfare going to the initial insured or investor in a policy. 
For example, the insurance company in Chawla v. Transamerica Oc-
cidental Life Insurance Co.211 likely saw an opportunity to have an insur-
ance policy invalidated for want of an insurable interest when the insured 
used a life insurance trust as a transaction vehicle, since Maryland law (the 
applicable law) had never addressed the question of whether a life insurance 
trust can have an insurable interest in the life of the insured.  As previously 
discussed, the court deciding the case held that the trust did not have an in-
surable interest in the life of the insured, even though the insured was the 
settlor and the creator of the trust.212  Significant costs must have been in-
curred in litigating this case.  In the end, the insurance company reaped all 
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the benefit of the risk taken on the insurance policy by invoking the insura-
ble interest doctrine, leaving the insured and his successors in interest with 
no value for years of premiums paid.  In addition, as a direct result of the 
Chawla decision, the NCCUSL drafted yet another patch to the insurable 
interest law.213  That patch attempts to create an insurable interest for trus-
tees,214 as part of the definition of what type of relationship qualifies for an 
insurable interest in an insurance policy that funds a trust.215  In an attempt 
to expand or contract what is within the ken of the insurable interest doc-
trine, many states and Model Act drafters have adopted varying solutions, 
creating an uneven landscape of regulation.216  The information inequality 
created by an uneven regulatory landscape, of course, can really only mean 
additional cost and burden being placed on the uninformed or misinformed 
insured—the precise individuals the insurable interest doctrine was meant 
to protect. 
E.  Additional Policy Problems Arising From Market Structure 
Since its English beginnings, the insurable interest doctrine has been 
held up as an area where individuals are protected against being used as an 
object of wager.217  A slightly more modern interpretation implies that mor-
al hazard is the real reason to keep the insurable interest doctrine around.  
That is, the insurable interest doctrine protects individuals against the risk 
of being killed for their insurance monies.  Taking these justifications as 
given, the doctrine still exhibits both internal definitional problems and ex-
ternal effects problems with its existence.  Thus, the insurable interest doc-
trine should be abolished. 
1.  Definitional Problems 
If the main purpose of the insurable interest doctrine is to protect the 
dignity of the individual and the individual’s right not to be used as a wager 
or a hedge without consent, the insurable interest doctrine has been a non-
starter from the beginning.  Many employers purchase insurance policies 
insuring the lives of their employees.  These policies, generally referred to 
as “corporate-owned life insurance” (COLI) or “employer-owned life insur-
ance” (EOLI), are used to fund employee benefit plans and buy-sell agree-
ments, and to protect employers against the financial consequences of the 
 
213 See INSURABLE INTEREST AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM TRUST CODE §113(b) (Nat’l 
Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2010). 
214 Id. §112(b). 
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216 See supra Part II. 
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Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:93 (2011) 
130 
death of a key employee.218  The insurable interest doctrine has always al-
lowed employers to take out insurance policies on the lives of their employ-
ees without the consent of the insureds, because a company has a pecuniary 
interest in a key employee or officer of its firm.219  Second, the insurable 
interest doctrine has always allowed an interest in the life of an insured by 
his or her spouse.220  This doctrine says nothing, though, of when an insura-
ble interest ends if a spouse has become estranged.  It likewise says nothing 
of co-domiciled couples or same sex civil unions.  Third, issues involved 
with how an insurable interest arises as to a contract of indemnity are com-
plex and unnecessary.221  The existence of four tests as to how an interest is 
created222 engenders substantial market uncertainty that harms consumers of 
such products writ large.  So, if one heeds dignity concerns, one should 
eliminate the need for an insurable interest doctrine for the holding of, but 
not for the inception of, a policy.  At the very least, insureds remain as a 
clearinghouse for insurance policy transferability.  This allows for cashing 
out of a policy, but does not eliminate the massive transaction costs associ-
ated with life settlements or the definitional problems described above.  
Thus, this half-measure would likely be insufficient to allow for a market to 
operate without a plethora of unnecessary actors and would also keep the 
insured on the hook for his or her policy and premiums. 
2.  Systemic Concerns 
A healthy secondary insurance market enhances liquidity for policy-
holders.223  By extension, a market unhampered by the insurable interest 
doctrine will further increase the liquidity of these policies, as policies will 
be unhampered by the legal uncertainty introduced by litigation at the time 
the settlement pays out.  A result of this increased liquidity, though, as in-
surance companies argue, is that the price of life insurance will rise, be-
cause “lapse rates” for insurance policies will drop in the absence of a ro-
bust insurable interest doctrine.224  As explained by the SEC: 
Currently, insurers may experience economic gains associated with 
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lapsed policies because insurers will have received premiums for 
these policies but will not be liable for payment of death claims as-
sociated with these policies.  These economic gains may be used to 
subsidize remaining policy owners.  Since life settlements provide 
policy owners with an alternative to allowing their policies to lapse, 
they may cause lapse rates to decline and reduce the subsidies avail-
able to the remaining policy owners.225 
Thus, because they are denied the return on lapsing or surrendered pol-
icies, life insurance companies claim that “the life settlement market . . . in-
creases the costs of providing policies in the primary market,” and further 
allege that “these costs will have to be passed on to consumers, which 
would ultimately make the consumers worse off.”226 
Life insurance lapse rates are based upon experience, so it is difficult 
to predict when lapse rates will rise or fall.227  However, the industry al-
ready prices insurance policies with very conservative predictions of 
lapse.228  Therefore, an open and free transferability market, or insurance 
procurement market, will likely have a very small effect on both pricing and 
profitability of insurance companies.229  Indeed, according to one analysis, 
“a life settlements transaction generally has minimal or no impact on the an-
ticipated profitability of a life insurance contract because the persistency of 
an unhealthy policyholder is precisely what is assumed at the time of origi-
nal pricing.”230  Thus, because the risk of an unhealthy policyholder is al-
ready priced into the market, and low lapse rates are assumed, the maxi-
mum amount prices in the insurance market would rise would be by the 
value of the option in favor of the insurance company created by judicial 
invalidation of a policy.231  In addition, current lapse rates have come under 
fire from state insurance regulators as it has become known that insurers 
abuse notice requirements in insurance policies to increase lapse rates and 
avoid the payment of the death benefit.232  The elimination of the insurable 
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interest doctrine would create greater efficiency by creating more vigilant 
policyholders and preventing lapse from occurring. 
There is an additional concern that the free transferability of life insur-
ance policies will lead to securitization of these policies.  If the insurable 
interest doctrine is eliminated, the argument goes, life policies will be treat-
ed akin to any other security, and an unhealthy number of unsophisticated 
market participants will enter the market for life insurance, akin to the col-
lateralized debt obligation or credit default swap markets. 
In 2010, the SEC examined state securities laws, and concluded that 
almost all states treat life settlements as securities under state law,233 alt-
hough the actual sources of that law are in great disarray.  The SEC found 
that the definition of life settlements as a security falls into four (yes, four!) 
different tranches.  First, “[a] majority of states include life settlements in 
their statutory definition of ‘security,’ either directly in that definition, or as 
part of the definition of ‘investment contract.’”234  Second, “[i]n a number 
of other states that do not include life settlements in their statutory defini-
tion of security or investment contract, courts or state regulators found life 
settlements to be a security under an investment contract analysis.”235  
Third, “[a] few other states have concluded that life settlements are securi-
ties pursuant to a statement of policy issued by state securities regula-
tors.”236  Finally, “[o]nly two states have not made a determination as to 
whether life settlements are securities under state law.”237  As of July 2010, 
no public securitizations of life insurance products have ever been done, but 
some privately offered life settlement securitizations have occurred.238  A 
market for “mortality swaps” does exist, and such swaps are rated by the 
Fitch rating agency.239  As it stands, mortality swaps are only available to 
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insurance companies.240  However, the ability to hedge against such risk 
should not be available only to one side of the ledger (insurance companies) 
and not the other (consumers).  This evidence of disparate types of securi-
ties, ranging from mortality swaps to the actual securitization of life poli-
cies, shows both that the market for securities based upon an individual life 
as the relevant equity is widely accepted, but also that a great deal of legal 
uncertainty exists due to non-uniformity among the products in this field. 
States are the primary regulators of the life insurance settlement mar-
ket because Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933241 exempts from 
federal regulation by the SEC any “insurance . . . policy” or “annuity con-
tract” issued by a corporation that is subject to the supervision of a state in-
surance commissioner, state bank commissioner, or similar state regulatory 
authority.242  However, this exemption does not apply to “variable life in-
surance policies,” or policies where the cash value and/or death benefit vary 
based on the performance of the assets in which the premium payments are 
invested.243  In contrast to a variable life insurance policy, a standard insur-
ance policy merely allocates a set death benefit, and the premiums go to the 
general account of the insurer.244  This divergence shows that the nature of 
the insurance market has always been vexing even for securities regulators.  
Further reflecting this point, the D.C. Circuit245 and the Eleventh Circuit246 
are split regarding the status of fractional interests in life settlements as se-
curities under the federal securities laws.  The SEC recently recommended 
that standard life settlement contracts be pulled into the definition of a secu-
rity under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.247  Uniform regulation, coupled with the elimination of the insurable 
interest doctrine, would allow alienated life insurance contracts to be secu-
ritized, to be sure, but it would force sunlight onto pre-existing securitiza-
tion under state schemes and (most importantly) would allow for consistent 
treatment of and standards for investors and consumers. 
If litigation under the current regime is any indication, the life settle-
ment market is extremely flawed for insured individuals because the insur-
able interest doctrine pushes the market sub rosa.  For example, at the 
height of the secondary market for life insurance in the last decade, “tens of 
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thousands of older people sought to make fast cash by taking out multimil-
lion-dollar policies to sell to investors.”248  However, as explained above, 
the insurable interest doctrine forces insured individuals to pay premiums 
on policies in the time between the origination of the policies and their sale 
to investors.249  Thus, once the market weakened at the end of the decade, 
“older people who took out life policies on assurances that could flip them 
to investors are suing agents, lenders, and insurers, claiming they were mis-
led into shelling out premiums on policies that ultimately found no buy-
ers.”250  Thus, when no buyers are found for a life insurance policy, the in-
sured loses past premiums paid and receives no cash remuneration for the 
policy.  The insured is then forced to stop paying premiums on the policy, 
the policy lapses, and the insurance company gets to retain the insurance 
premiums without the obligation to pay out on the policy.  All of this is be-
cause the insurable interest doctrine requires that a “cloak” be used, as ex-
plained above, in order to effectuate the cash out of these STOLI policies.251  
The elimination of the doctrine would allow investors to invest in the life 
insurance market without forcing an insured individual to be on the hook 
for premium payments.  The great advantages of this approach are certainty 
and the streamlining of the number of persons involved in an insurance pol-
icy’s formation. 
Because the insurable interest doctrine forces several third parties252 
into a transaction that is essentially an arrangement to take out a futures 
contract on a person’s life, it creates massive informational problems for 
investors.  This problem arises in the actuarial component of the current life 
settlements market.  For example, Life Partners Holdings Inc., in Waco, 
Texas, arranged for investors to buy several billion dollars of life insurance 
policies from their original owners.253  However, Life Partners had to en-
gage in the procedure of analyzing the life expectancies of the insured indi-
viduals because it is a crucial part of the investment equation.254  Generally, 
the shorter an insured person’s expected life span, the more Life Partners 
could charge for the policy, because investors could expect a faster pay-
out.255  Life Partners marketed to investors that they should expect a ten to 
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fifteen percent payout if they invested in a pool of life insurance policies 
tagged to individuals with a certain lifespan.256  However, these life expec-
tancies were calculated by a Reno, Nevada physician who testified that he 
sometimes did dozens of these life expectancy estimates a day and didn’t 
review his prior predictions for accuracy.257  Therefore, because of the flaw 
in these life expectancy estimates, returns on these policies began to miss 
their ten to fifteen year mortality targets, and investors alleged that they 
were misled by Life Partners’ marketing schemes.258  In the meantime, as 
the arranger of deals between insureds and investors, Life Partners had ex-
tracted “often-hefty fees in the deals.”259  Essentially, a firm like Life Part-
ners exists at the behest of the insurable interest doctrine by creating the 
necessary cloak to bring together investors and insureds.  The elimination 
of the doctrine would force these transactions out from under the cloak and 
allow for greater informational clarity.  Investors will demand that insur-
ance companies make actuarially accurate guesses about the life span of an 
individual insured, and insurance companies will be on notice about to 
whom and where the policy will pay out at its inception. 
One final traditional concern in this area is that if insurance policies 
are able to be taken out by “strangers” to an insured, then moral hazard will 
either dictate that the subject of the policy (a person in life insurance sce-
narios, or an object in indemnity policy scenarios) will be destroyed by the 
person taking out the policy and/or there will be an incentive to take less 
good care of a person who is the subject of the insurance.  The first concern, 
about moral hazard leading to the untimely demise of an individual, is obvi-
ated by laws in other areas, notably trust and estate law, called “slayer” 
laws.260  Codified statutorily in many states, but generally stemming from 
common law, slayer laws prohibiting inheritance by a person who murders 
someone from whom she stands to inherit.261  Some states’ case law even 
goes so far as to limit the right of the killer’s descendants to take property 
under a will or the relevant intestacy statutes.262  Since insurance payments 
from the death benefit pay into a trust under the most common policies, or 
are reviewed by the insurance company prior to payment, slayer laws would 
likely prevent murderers from collecting on these policies.  The second is-
sue of taking less good care of an individual from whom an insurance poli-
cy is supposed to pay out is already an issue that exists under the current 
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life settlement regime, and the risk of such lower care of that may not nec-
essarily be any different under a regime which is merely less cumbersome 
because of the elimination of the insurable interest doctrine. 
IV.  A NATURAL EXPERIMENT: THE DEATH OF INSURABLE 
INTEREST IN AUSTRALIA 
The argument that the insurable interest doctrine should be eliminated 
is further bolstered by the Australian experience.  The insurable interest 
doctrine is effectively dead in Australia.263  In 1982, the Australian Law Re-
form Commission recommended the insurable interest doctrine be eliminat-
ed for property.264  The Commission also intimated that the policy should be 
eliminated for life insurance: 
The need to allow policyholders to use policies as a form of property, 
together with the uncertainty that would be introduced into insurance 
practice if the policyholder were required to have an interest at the 
date of death of the life insured, constitute[s] an adequate justifica-
tion for not restricting the existing freedom of assignment.265 
The road to the modern day status of insurable interest in Australia is 
instructive for the American system, as the two systems share the same 
roots in two English statutes266 and similar trajectories in the creation of a 
complex market for secondary life insurance products. 
In Australia, the requirement of an insurable interest was said to serve 
three main policies: (i) to discourage wagering on lives in the form of insur-
ance; (ii) to minimize the risk of destruction of the object of the insurance; 
and (iii) (in the case of property) to restrict the insured to no more than a 
full recovery for its actual loss.267  Given Australia’s English provenance, 
the English Marine Insurance Act of 1745 and Life Insurance Act of 1774 
remained in effect to govern the insurance world until they were altered by 
the Australian Marine Insurance Act of 1909268 and Insurance Contracts Act 
of 1984.269  Australia’s Marine Insurance Act of 1909 stated that marine in-
surance that amounted to a wager was void; but, if a contract of marine in-
surance were entered into with the intention of obtaining an insurable inter-
 
263 See SUTTON, supra note 11, at 531. 
264 AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, INSURANCE CONTRACTS 87–88 (1982). 
265 Id. 
266 Marine Insurance Act, 1745, 19 Geo. 2, c. 37 (Eng.); Life Assurance Act, 1774, 14 
Geo. 3, c. 48, § I (Eng.). 
267 See Kosmopoulos v. Constitution Ins. Co., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2, 25 (Can.) (citing Ber-
tram Hartnett & David V. Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic 
Reevaluation of a Legal Concept, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1178–83 (1948)). 
268 Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth) ss 5–6 (Austl.). 
269 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) ss 5–7 (Austl.). 
The Comparative Case Against the Insurable Interest Doctrine 
32:93 (2011) 
137 
est, it was held valid.270  That legal stance, while statutorily applying to only 
marine contracts from the 1909 law, is said to have applied more broadly to 
non-marine risks in property until 1984.271  The Life Insurance Act of 1945 
altered the landscape for insurable interest for life insurance by delineating 
five categories where an insurable interest would arise.272  An insurable in-
terest was given to: (i) the parent of a child under 21; (ii) a wife to a hus-
band and vice versa; (iii) any person who depended upon the support of the 
insured in whole or in part; (iv) a corporation or other person in the life of 
an officer or employee; and (v) a person who had a pecuniary interest in the 
duration of the life of another person.273  Thus, until 1984, essentially the 
same legislation and case law as the English system governed the Australi-
an system, with a few differences in how far an insurable interest would ex-
tend.  At least one scholar and court indicate that there was a presumption 
during this time in favor of finding an insurable interest because it was of-
ten a technical objection—made by insurance companies—after premiums 
had been paid to an insurer by an insured.274 
In 1984, Australia made a sharp break with its American and English 
contemporaries by eliminating the insurable interest requirement for in-
demnity contracts and other property insurance contracts.275  Section 16 of 
the Insurance Contracts Act of 1984 provides that a contract of “general in-
surance” is not void if the insured did not have an insurable interest in the 
subject of the insurance at the time that the contract is formed.276  The 1984 
Act effectively abandons the “legal interest” test outlined in Macaura in fa-
vor of a test based in economic loss for indemnity contracts.277  Therefore, 
since an insured normally has to show that “he or she has suffered loss as a 
result of an event insured against before he or she can recover under the 
policy . . . proof of loss is equivalent to proof of interest.”278  Thus, some-
what elegantly, “[f]lexibility to both insurer and [insured] is achieved with-
out in any way promoting gaming and wagering in the form of insurance or 
adding to the risk of the destruction of the property insured.”279 However, 
the 1984 Act stops short of eliminating an insurable interest for life insur-
 
270 See SUTTON supra note 11, at 506. 
271 Id. at 515. 
272 Life Insurance Act 1945 (Cth) s 86(1) (Austl.). 
273 Id. s 86(1)(a)–(f). 
274 See SUTTON, supra note 11, at 524 (citing Stock v. Inglis, [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 564, 571 
(Eng.)). 
275 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 11(1) (Austl.). 
276 Id. s 16(1). 
277 See SUTTON, supra note 11, at 528. 
278 Id. at 527. 
279 Id. at 528. 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 32:93 (2011) 
138 
ance contracts.280  By delineating life insurance contracts broadly as a sepa-
rate category of insurance still requiring traditional insurable interest re-
quirements at the time of contract formation,281 the insurable interest doc-
trine was only partially abrogated. 
In 1995, Australia took yet another break from the common law and its 
contemporaries by abolishing the insurable interest requirement for life in-
surance altogether.282  According to one scholar, “[t]he rationale behind the 
previous insistence on [the] requirement—the reduction of the temptation to 
murder the life insured in the hope of obtaining the proceeds from the life 
insurance, and the discouragement of wagering and gaming—apparently no 
longer holds sway.”283  Since the common law does not require an interest 
in the life of the insured at the time of death,284 and the 1995 Life Insurance 
Act no longer requires such an interest at the time of formation,285 the in-
surable interest doctrine is gone in Australia.  Up until 1995, the market for 
the assignment of life insurance policies had grown in Australia to the point 
where the law recognized the assignments of life policies, subject only to 
compliance with the necessary convoluted procedure involving cloaks simi-
lar to the U.S. system described above.286  In exactly the same fashion, 
many American jurisdictions recognize the assignment of life policies, sub-
ject to procedures that satisfy the insurable interest doctrine.287 
The 1995 Act allows the transfer of life insurance policies by simple 
assent of the transferor and the transferee, subject to disclosure require-
ments.288  The process was simplified because the Australian Law Reform 
Commission thought that life insurance ought to be treated as property; 
thus: 
[T]he need to allow policy holders to use policies as a form of prop-
erty, together with the uncertainty that would be introduced into in-
surance practice if the policy holder were required to have an interest 
at the date of death of the life insured, constitute an adequate justifi-
cation for not restricting the . . . freedom of assignment.289 
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Moreover, the law, as written, eliminates the requirement for the insured to 
have an insurable interest at any point of an insurance transaction.290  Thus, 
the Australian legislature seems to have made a balanced decision on the 
elimination of the insurable interest doctrine completely.  On the one hand, 
the legislature was prepared to accept the risk that the risk of wagering or 
gaming on the lives of others will increase.  On the other hand, in exchange 
for eliminating the insurable interest doctrine, it created a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme intended to streamline the market; and, it eliminated the 
need to draft detailed provisions as to whether an insurable interest could 
exist in certain relationships and as to whether and what type of loss was 
necessary to occur to effectuate an insurance policy ex post. 
To be sure, the Australian authorities did not enact the 1995 Act with-
out any regard for regulation.  The elimination of the insurable interest doc-
trine came with the creation of a comprehensive regulatory scheme in two 
major divisions of the Australian government.  In 1998, the Australian Pru-
dential Regulation Authority was created to administer the Life Insurance 
Act of 1995.291  Furthermore, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission is charged with administering the Insurance Contracts Act of 
1984.292  These two regulatory bodies maintain the difference between in-
demnity contracts dealing with property and life insurance policies dealing 
with life insurance regulation that began in the eighteenth century and con-
tinues to press against law today. 
After the introduction of the 1995 Act, the Australian securitization 
market developed rapidly into one of the most active outside the U.S.293  
The Australian insurance industry is not suffering either, according to statis-
tics released as recently as June 2010.294  Net profit after tax was $2.765 bil-
lion Australian dollars ($2.229 billion USD), up from $1.985 billion Aus-
tralian dollars in the previous year.  Industry revenue totaled $29.896 billion 
Australian dollars ($3.155 billion USD), up from $24.448 billion in the pre-
vious year.  In what is likely to have been a remarkable year, the return on 
net assets for the life insurance industry alone was 17.3%.  As is clear from 
these statistics, a robust, profitable insurance market can (and does) exist in 
the absence of the insurable interest doctrine as a “safety valve.” 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The insurable interest doctrine has outlived its effectiveness.  Ameri-
can regulators can learn much from the successes of their peer insurance 
regulators in England and Australia.  The lessons from those nations’ elimi-
nation of the doctrine are easily transferable to the U.S.  The American in-
surance markets are not ostensibly different as to life and indemnity insur-
ance law from their English and Australian counterparts.  The elimination 
of the doctrine would be a boon to both insurance companies and consum-
ers seeking greater clarity in the rules governing the rights and responsibili-
ties within insurance contracts.  Many states are currently reviewing their 
insurance law regulations to attract insurers; the insurable interest doctrine 
should be eliminated in an effort to make doing business in those states 
more efficient for both consumers and insurers.295 
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